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Conflicts over the use and regulation of various technologies
pervade public discourse and have dramatic implications for
the public interest. Controversies over the regulation of geneti-
cally modified products, nuclear power, and nanotechnology,
among others, provoke some of the most socially and politically
volatile debates of our time. These technology conflicts extract a
substantial price from society-they create costly inefficiencies,
prevent society from optimally managing new technologies, con-
sume vast resources, and retard technological growth. This
Article develops a framework for understanding technology
controversies, and consequently proposes new means for resolv-
ing or ameliorating a variety of seemingly intractable legal and
regulatory standoffs. These teachings have potentially far-
reaching consequences for conflict resolution in non-technology
areas as well.
t © 2005 by Gregory N. Mandel. All rights reserved.
* Associate Professor of Law, Albany Law School. I am grateful to attendees of
presentations of this Article at Cornell Law School, California Western School of Law, and
Albany Law School, and for insightful comments on earlier drafts from David Adelman,
Anita Bernstein, Stephen Clark, James Gathii, Chris Guthrie, Sheldon Halpern, Lisa Heinzer-
ling, Douglas Kysar, Timothy Lytton, Alyson Mandel, Richard Parker, Jeffrey Rachlinski,
Michael Saks, Peter Schuck, and Amy Sinden. Thais Triehy and Luke Nikas provided out-
standing research assistance.
118 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 11:117
INTRODU CTION ...................................................................................... 119
I. CHARACTERISTICS OF TECHNOLOGY CONFLICT ....................... 122
A. Interest Group Positions and Public Opinion
in Technology Conflicts ..................................................... 122
1. Interest Group Positions ............................................. 123
2. Public A ttitudes .......................................................... 127
B. Inefficient and Costly Technology Conflict ....................... 129
1. N uclear Pow er ............................................................ 130
2. Genetically Modified Products ................................... 132
3. Conflict Entrepreneurs and Hardliners ....................... 135
C. Conundrums in Technology Conflict ................................. 137
II. A FRAMEWORK OF TECHNOLOGY CONFLICT ........................... 142
A. Socio-Cultural Risk Preference Formation ....................... 144
1. The Cultural Theory of Risk Preference ................. 144
2. Critique of Cultural Theory ........................................ 150
3. Functionalist Socio-Cultural Risk Perception ............ 156
B. Behavioral Economics and Cognitive and
Social Psychology ............................................................. 157
1. Behavioral and Psychological
Causes of Polarization ................................................ 159
2. Behavioral and Psychological
Exacerbation of Deadlock .......................................... 163
C. The Destabilization of Science .......................................... 169
D. Lack of Compromise Advocacy ......................................... 172
III. BRIDGING TECHNOLOGY CONFLICT ......................................... 174
A. Cultural Dialogue and Deliberation ................................. 176
B . D ebiasing .......................................................................... 18 1
C. Confidence-Building Measures ......................................... 184
C ONCLUSION ......................................................................................... 188
Technology Wars
INTRODUCTION
Conflicts over the use and regulation of various technologies per-
vade public discourse and have dramatic implications for the public
interest. Will genetically modified food eradicate hunger, wreak envi-
ronmental havoc, or both? Will next-generation nuclear power plants
provide safe, plentiful, emission-free energy that cures our foreign en-
ergy dependence, or invite nuclear catastrophe? Will rapidly advancing
nanotechnology revolutionize health-care, the nature of computers, and
the structure of materials, or will it lead to as yet uncontemplated new
forms of pollution and cancer?
The resolution of these questions will significantly impact human
health, the environment, the economy, and society as a whole. Optimal
resolution could yield extraordinary societal benefits, but such a result
seems unattainable. To deal productively with these vital questions, we
must approach them not only with a scientific and social understanding
of the relevant technology, but also in the context of a functional democ-
ratic discourse about use and regulation of the technology. The former
task, though difficult, is achievable. Functional discourse, however, is
largely absent from technology debates, and the climate necessary for
productive discourse is poisoned.
Biotechnology and nuclear power' represent two of the most politi-
cally and socially explosive technology controversies, presenting legal
and regulatory debates that appear largely unresolvable. One side in the
genetically modified products debate argues vehemently that such prod-
ucts will provide spectacular food supply, pharmaceutical, and
environmental benefits, and offer no significant causes of concern; the
other side argues just as strongly that genetically modified products
pose extreme human, environmental, and social risks, and offer no sig-
nificant benefit to society. One side in the nuclear power debate argues
strenuously that nuclear power is a safe, low-pollution energy alterna-
tive; the other side argues just as strongly that it is far too dangerous to
consider using.
Many other technology conflicts2 fit this same mold: debates over
global warming and climate change, vaccination, energy production at
the Arctic National Wildlife Reserve, stem cell research and use, and the
application of nanotechnology are some examples. Decades of study
1. All discussion of nuclear power in this Article refers to the use of nuclear power
for energy/electricity generation, not to the use of nuclear power for military or weapons
purposes.
2. The term "technology conflict," and similar terms used throughout this Article,
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have done little to ameliorate these conflicts. Impassioned appeals to
evidence, research, and reason likewise appear ineffectual.
The persistence of technology conflicts exacts a substantial social
price. First, the debates themselves create costly inefficiencies-they
foster legal and policy paralysis that prevents implementation of socially
and widely beneficial solutions to pressing problems. Second, technol-
ogy debates consume vast resources-including public and private
financial, legal, temporal, and personnel costs-that could more valuably
be directed towards other problems. Third, technology conflict retards
technological growth, resulting in lost opportunities for human health
and environmental protection, economic growth, and improvements in
social welfare.
Despite the prominence and costly nature of technology controver-
sies, existing scholarship does not explain or adequately address the
teleology of conflicts over technology. A significant body of work has
considered institutional decision-making and paralysis generally, some-
times with direct or indirect application to technology controversies.3
The existing literature, however, has largely ignored the critical role in-
dividual members of the public play in these controversies, and the
manner in which the controversies are shaped by individual preferences.
Individual opinion formation, behavior, psychology, and perception each
play a considerable role in creating and perpetuating technology con-
flict. The battle over biotechnology, for example, depends significantly
on individual psychology (is genetic engineering new, or similar to con-
ventional cross-breeding?), perception (will genetically modified crops
lead to the industrialization and monopolization of agriculture?), prefer-
ences (are family farms more important than inexpensive food?), and
behavior (involvement in pro- or anti- biotechnology advocacy). Exam-
ining the crucial role of the individual in technology conflict sheds
important light on understanding these conflicts, and reveals new oppor-
tunities for resolving them.
Any technology controversy solution must recognize that both sci-
ence and culture strongly influence and generate conflict over
technology preferences. The conflation of science and culture in tech-
nology debates, however, impairs understanding of the separate role of
each and muddies their contours so that the independent impact of each
on discourse cannot be clearly recognized. The role of culture blurs the
understanding of science, while science blurs the understanding of cul-
3. There are many models of institutional behavior and decision-making; public
choice theory is one prominent example. See, e.g., MAXWELL L. STEARNS, PUBLIC CHOICE
AND PUBLIC LAW: READINGS AND COMMENTARY (1997). Other works have analyzed institu-
tional decision-making in specific instances. See, e.g., GRAHAM T. ALLISON & PHILIP
ZELIKOW, ESSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS (2d ed. 1999).
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ture's role. The conflation of science and culture renders technology
debates dysfunctional and impedes resolution through democratic dis-
course. Solving technology conflict requires a distinction between the
influences of science and culture so that each can be individually fo-
cused on and valued."
Towards these ends, and in an effort to resolve some of the most in-
tractable current legal and regulatory standoffs, this Article attempts to
reconceptualize debates over technology by integrating original empiri-
cal research and a multi-disciplinary body of scholarship from the fields
of law, behavioral economics, psychology, and political science. My
goal here is first to create a framework that provides insight into ineffi-
ciency and polarization in technology conflict, and into the related
democratic and market failures that inhibit resolution of these conflicts,
and second to use that framework to provide more productive bases for
seeking resolution to technology conflict. Ultimately, I hope to posit a
means for transforming technology debates from dysfunctional diatribe
into generative discourse. The framework developed in this Article ap-
plies to the biotechnology and nuclear power controversies mentioned
above, as well as to many other technology conflicts; it does not, how-
ever, apply to every technology conflict, as discussed below.
Investigation of the causes and potential cures for technology con-
flict evolves in three steps: examining the nature of technology conflict,
diagnosing the sources of such conflict, and developing solutions based
on the diagnosis. The three Parts of this Article correspond to these
three steps. Part I examines the characteristics of technology conflict
and demonstrates empirically that polarization exists and has very costly
consequences. Part II of the Article draws on a wide body of research to
develop a framework that provides a descriptive account of the paraly-
sis, polarization, and inefficiency present in technology conflict. Part III
of the Article leverages insights from the framework to propose innova-
tive recommendations for resolving technology conflicts. Taken
together, the descriptive and prescriptive analyses have potentially far-
reaching consequences for improving discourse and resolving conflict,
not only concerning various technologies but in application to other po-
larized legal and political debates as well.
4. As discussed further, identifying a distinction between science and culture does
not indicate that the influences of each are precisely dichotomous. See, e.g., Wendy E. Wag-
ner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613 (1995) (arguing
that scientific issues contain value choices embedded within them); Gregory N. Mandel,,
Comment, Toward a Better Decision-Making Process: Finding the Truth in Policy and Re-
moving False Science, 15 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 65 (1996) (discussing the improper
use of science as a basis for policy decisions).
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I am not concerned with convincing anyone to change his or her be-
liefs or values concerning any particular technology. Rather, I hope,
through the mechanisms suggested here, to enable individuals to recog-
nize the actual preferences underlying their beliefs and the bases for
those preferences, and how differing preferences often are mutually
achievable, or at least reconcilable, even as individuals continue to dis-
agree. Such achievement can lead to revolutionary resolution of
decades-old technology wars.
I. CHARACTERISTICS OF TECHNOLOGY CONFLICT
The causes of technology conflict cannot be diagnosed without first
understanding the various contours of the conflicts and the impact they
have on society. For the purpose of investigating these contours and im-
pacts, I focus on case studies of two of the most controversial
technologies: genetically modified products and nuclear power.
A. Interest Group Positions and Public Opinion
in Technology Conflicts
The regulation and use of genetically modified products and of nu-
clear power to produce energy present particularly socially and
politically divisive issues. As noted in the Introduction, the opposing
sides in each debate take almost completely contradictory positions. The
sides disagree on each technology's benefits, risks, economic influences,
human health effects, environmental impacts, social consequences, and
a host of other issues. These mutually antagonistic positions create ap-
parently intractable debates over use and regulation of the technologies.
Although the hypothesis that these debates exist and are both polar-
ized5 and deadlocked 6 appears self-evident, it nevertheless should be
examined as it is important to the analysis of the causes of, and potential
solutions to, technology conflict. This section provides empirical evi-
dence demonstrating that the hypothesized characterization is well
justified. The evidence for the existence of polarization and deadlock is
found in the contrasting positions of interest groups and in public opin-
ion surveys.
5. "Polarized" as used in this Article refers to opposing parties taking strongly diver-
gent positions. The more every individual's position falls within one of the opposing camps,
and few or no individuals take positions between the camps, the more polarized an issue is.
In addition, the further apart the camps are, the more polarized they are.
6. "Deadlock" as used in this Article refers to the maintenance of positions over time;
a state in which few individuals alter their views on a given issue.
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1. Interest Group Positions
This section presents the results of a survey study of the positions of
interest groups involved in the genetically modified product and nuclear
power debates.
Genetically modified product interest groups are considered first. To
ensure an unbiased interest group dataset, an initial dataset of fifteen
groups was taken from an unrelated earlier study on genetically modi-
fied foods.7 Literature and media searches were conducted in order to
identify additional interest groups that expressed positions concerning
the benefits or risks of genetically modified products. All interest groups
based in significant part in the United States that expressed significant
opinions concerning transgenic products on a regional or national scope
were included! No groups were "weeded out." This resulted in a final
dataset of twenty-eight interest groups.
Each of the groups in the dataset was evaluated to identify its posi-
tions on specific benefits offered by genetically modified products (e.g.,
that genetically modified crops will increase crop yields) or specific
risks (e.g., that they will create herbicide-resistant "superweeds"). This
evaluation was based solely on each group's own literature (primarily
from each group's website). As such, it represents each group's self-
proclaimed positions. The specific individual benefits and risks were
then tallied for each group to provide an internal numerical representa-
tion of its level of support versus opposition to genetically modified
products. The results are shown in Table 1.9
The ratio of risks to total risks-plus-benefits provides a good
mechanism for examining the level of an interest group's support or op-
position, and thus for examining polarization. These ratios for
genetically modified product interest groups are charted in Figure 1.
The results are striking. The vast majority of genetically modified
product interest groups (twenty-three of twenty-eight, or 82%) promote
the position that genetically modified products are either entirely bene-
ficial (and present no risks) or entirely risky (and provide no benefit).
These twenty-three interest groups do not, in general, explicitly state
that genetically modified products offer no benefits or pose no risks.
However, by providing a wealth of information on the products, but
7. CAROL L. SILVA ET AL., MIDWESTERN POLICY ScI. ASS'N, 'BENEFITS FROM Bio-
TECHNOLOGY' OR 'RISKS FROM GENETIC MANIPULATION': FRAMING EFFECTS, MENTAL
IMAGES AND PREFERENCES FOR GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS (2002).
8. "Significant" here simply contrasts with a group that may make a passing refer-
ence to genetically modified products, but does not appear substantially concerned with the
issue.
9. The total number of risks and benefits identified by each group ranged from a low
of seven to a high of thirty-three; the median total was 14.5.
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identifying either only benefits or risks, the groups implicitly indicate
(at a minimum) that the products either are not risky or not beneficial,
and thus promote such a conclusion. Only two groups (7%) identify
numbers of benefits and risks that are remotely proximate (both present
evenly balanced benefits and risks).
TABLE I
GENETICALLY MODIFIED PRODUCT INTEREST
GROUP POSITIONS
Organization Risks Benefits
Alliance for Better Foods 0 10
Alliance for Bio-Integrity 14 0
American Farm Bureau 0 8
Biotechnology Industry Organization 3 30
Campaign to Label GE Foods 16 0
Center for Food Safety 16 0
Center for Science in the Public Interest 10 10
Council for Biotechnology Information 0 22
Council for Responsible Genetics 15 0
CropLife America 0 11
Earth Liberation Front 9 0
Environmental Defense 10 0
Farmers Declaration on GE in Agriculture 12 0
Free the Planet 12 0
Friends of the Earth 13 0
Greenpeace 12 0
Grocery Manufacturers of America 0 12
Hudson Institute 0 16
Mothers for Natural Law 17 0
National Campaign for Sustainable Agriculture 9 0
Natural Resources Defense Council 7 0
Organic Consumers Association 17 0
PEW Initiative on Food and Biotechnology 9 9
Public Citizen 13 0
Say No to GMOs 20 0
Sierra Club 19 1
Union of Concerned Scientists 18 4
U.S. PIRG 17 0
Technology Wars
FIGURE 1
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A similar study of the positions of interest groups involved in the
nuclear power debate was conducted. Literature and media searches
identified thirteen United States interest groups taking national positions
on nuclear power issues. ' Once again, each of the groups in the dataset
was evaluated to determine its self-identified positions on specific bene-
fits or specific risks, and these positions were tallied. The results are
shown in Table 2." The ratios of risks to total risks-plus-benefits for nu-
clear power interest groups are charted in Figure 2.
Though not as dramatic as genetically modified products, nuclear
power interest group polarization is quite substantial as well. 2 Six of the
thirteen groups (46%) promote the position that nuclear power is
10. Local groups advocating only in relation to isolated plants were not included. The
Nuclear Energy Agency is an intergovernmental organization based in Paris, in which the
United States is a member.
11. The total number of risks and benefits identified by each group ranged from a low
of three to a high of fourteen; the median was eight.
12. Two differences between the sets of interest groups are notable. First, as discussed
below, the biotechnology groups appear more polarized than the nuclear power groups. This
result was unanticipated, and appears to be converse to the public opinion survey data re-
ported below, infra Part I.A.2, which indicate greater polarization among individuals on
nuclear power. The results do not necessarily contradict each other: individuals may be more
polarized on nuclear power, while interest groups are more polarized on biotechnology. This
interpretation points to interesting dynamics worthy of further study. The second notable
difference is that there are currently substantially more biotechnology interest groups than
nuclear power groups (28 to 13).
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entirely risky;'3 all but one (92%) promote the position that nuclear
power is either nearly entirely beneficial or nearly entirely risky. No
groups identify numbers of benefits and risks that are relatively close to
each other.
In sum, the interest group position analyses provide strong empiri-
cal evidence of substantial polarization on issues surrounding
genetically modified products and nuclear power.14
TABLE 2
NUCLEAR POWER INTEREST GROUP POSITIONS
Organization Risks Benefits
American Lung Association 1 3
American Nuclear Society 4 10
Citizens Awareness Network 8 0
Environmental Defense 5 1
Greenpeace 3 0
Nuclear Energy Agency 1 5
Nuclear Energy Institute 1 13
Nuclear Information and Resource Service 11 0
Nuclear Management Company 1 12
Public Citizen 7 0
Sierra Club 3 0
Union of Concerned Scientists 13 0
World Nuclear Association 2 8
13. As with the genetically modified product groups, these six groups, in general, do
not explicitly state that nuclear power offers no benefits, but they implicitly indicate such by
their presentation of information. See supra text discussing Table I and Figure 1.
14. Although significant, these studies' results should not be over-interpreted. The
studies are limited in several respects. First, the number of risks and benefits a group identi-
fies provides only a surrogate (though likely a good one) for the actual level of support or
opposition to a technology. Second, different interest groups have different levels of impact
on the technology debates, and therefore on the levels of polarization and deadlock. This
study, however, treats each group equally, rather than based on their prominence or weight in
technology debates. There are possible surrogates for trying to measure these impacts, such
as group membership levels or frequency of media references. These surrogates, however,
are too weakly linked to offer enough added value in light of the additional uncertainty they
would introduce. See, e.g., Ariella Vraneski & Ravit Richter, What's News? Reflections of
Intractable Environmental Conflicts in the News: Some Promises, Many Premises, 21 CON-
FLICT RESOL. Q. 239, 250 (2003) (noting that certain stakeholder positions in environmental
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2. Public Attitudes
Surveys of public attitudes toward biotechnology and nuclear power
also reveal polarization, though the general public is not as polarized as
the interest groups. The Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology gath-
ers information on public attitudes towards introducing genetically
modified food into the United States food supply. Pew's most recent
data, from 2003, show that 31% of respondents "strongly oppose" such
an introduction and 13% "strongly favor" it.'5 Thus, close to half the
respondents took positions at the extremes of their possible responses.
73% of respondents took oppose or favor positions in general, as op-
posed to a neutral or moderate position.'
6
These findings are supported by other public survey data, consistently
revealing that about three-quarters or more of respondents take non-
moderate positions on genetically modified products.' 7 This polarization is
15. Memorandum from The Mellman Group, Inc. & Public Opinion Strategies, Inc., to
The Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology, Americans' Knowledge of Genetically Modi-
fied Foods Remains Low and Opinions on Safety Still Split 2 (Sept. 18, 2003), available at
http://pewagbiotech.org/newsroom/releases/091803.php3 (last visited May 11, 2005).
16. Id. at 2. The terms "polar," "extreme," and "moderate" (and their synonyms) as
used throughout this Article are descriptive only; i.e., positions are defined as polar, extreme,
or moderate in relation to each other. These terms are not intended to indicate that there is
anything wrong or incorrect about taking a polar or extreme position on an issue, or that
there is anything right or correct about taking a moderate position.
17. The most recent National Science Board survey on public attitudes towards ge-
netic engineering found that 40% of respondents believed the benefits of genetic engineering
outweighed the harmful results, 33% believed the harms outweighed the benefits, and 28%
Spring 2005]
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significantly greater, for example, than the polarization displayed in
surveys asking respondents to rate themselves on a liberal-conservative
scale.' The surveys also demonstrate a roughly even split between sup-
port for and opposition to transgenic products.' 9
Polarization also is revealed by greater divisiveness in public atti-
tudes towards biotechnology than toward other technologies. A survey
by Gaskell and Bauer queried respondents about their positions on seven
different technologies. 20 Nuclear power was one, and is discussed below.
Public attitudes toward the five remaining technologies all were consid-
erably less polarized and more uniform than attitudes towards
biotechnology.2
Longitudinal National Science Board data demonstrate that public
opinion on genetically modified products is deadlocked as well as being
polarized. Comparing the most recent survey (from 2001) with the sur-
vey from 1995, when the first genetically modified food item was
believed the benefits and harms were roughly equal. NAT'L Sci. BD., SCIENCE AND ENGI-
NEERING INDICATORS 7-17 (2002), available at http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/seind02/start.htm
[hereinafter INDICATORS 2002] (results do not add up to 100%, presumably due to rounding)
(last visited May 11, 2005). Similar to the Pew results, 73% of respondents took a non-
moderate position. A third public attitude survey, the Gaskell and Bauer survey, found that
over 50% of respondents believe genetic engineering would "improve our way of life" in the
next 20 years, while over 30% believe it would "make things worse." Id. at 7-21. Close to
85% of respondents took a non-moderate position.
18. John Tierney, A Nation Divided? Who Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 13, 2004, (Week in
Review), at 1. It is not possible to identify what an expected distribution of opinions is ex
ante. A normal distribution, for instance, would yield significantly more individuals holding
moderate positions than holding polar positions.
19. The National Science Board data were relatively evenly split between support and
opposition, while the Pew data demonstrated greater opposition and the Gaskell and Bauer
data greater support. This discrepancy is likely partially due to the wording of the survey
questions. The Pew study focused on genetically modified food, as opposed to genetic engi-
neering generally; the latter includes the production of pharmaceutical products and other
medical uses, which are generally supported to a greater extent. See Paul Slovic, Perception
of Risk: Reflections on the Psychometric Paradigm, in SOCIAL THEORIES OF RISK 117, 127
(Sheldon Krimsky & Dominic Golding eds., 1992) (discussing how the use of technologies
for medical purposes is generally supported to a greater extent than uses of the same or simi-
lar technologies for non-medical purposes).
20. INDICATORS 2002, supra note 17, at 7-21. The six other technologies were solar
energy, computers, telecommunications, nuclear power, space exploration, and the internet.
Id.
21. Id. at 7-21. The difference between levels of support and opposition to biotech-
nology was about 20%, and the ratio between these levels approximately 1.5:1. The
differences between levels of support and opposition to the other five technologies were
much greater, ranging from 50% to about 85%; the ratios between the levels were vastly
higher, ranging from 4:1 to over 40:1. Id. As noted above, technology conflict does not arise
with all technologies. Understanding when it arises is explored in Part H.
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commercialized, reveals that public attitudes shifted little, if at all, dur-
ing these six years.22
As with biotechnology, opinions on nuclear power are polarized and
deadlocked. The debate over the use of nuclear power for electricity
generation has been going on in the United States since the early
1970s.23 The public survey data reveal that 75% to 85% of respondents
take non-moderate positions on nuclear power.24 The Gaskell and Bauer
survey found that attitudes towards nuclear power are more polarized
than attitudes towards any of the other technologies studied, including
biotechnology.2
National Science Board data also demonstrate that public opinion
on nuclear power has remained deadlocked. Reports reviewing data on
public attitudes towards nuclear power from 1985 to 1999 conclude that
Americans "have been evenly divided for more than a decade over the
use of nuclear power to generate electricity.
26
The empirical data on both interest group positions and public opin-
ion demonstrate, as hypothesized, that attitudes towards genetically
modified products and nuclear power are polarized and have remained
deadlocked.
B. Inefficient and Costly Technology Conflict
In addition to being polarized and deadlocked, technology conflict
is also costly. Such conflict creates substantial inefficiencies, prevents
society from optimally regulating the technologies at issue, consumes
22. INDICATORS 2002, supra note 17, at 7-17. For 1995, 43% believed the benefits
outweighed the harms, 35% that the harms outweighed the benefits, and 22% that the bene-
fits and harms were roughly equal. For 1999, the corresponding results were 44%, 38%, and
18%. For 2001, they were 40%, 33%, and 28%. Id.
23. MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE: AN ESSAY ON THE
SELECTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS 139-51 (1982). Anti-
nuclear protests prior to this time were focused on nuclear weapons, not nuclear energy. Id.
at 139-40.
24. Gaskell and Bauer found that 42% of respondents believe that nuclear power "will
improve our way of life" and 33% believe it "will make things worse." INDICATORS 2002,
supra note 17, at 7-21. The National Science Board found that 48% of respondents believed
the benefits of nuclear power outweighed any harms, 37% believed that the harms out-
weighed any benefits, and 15% believed that the harms and benefits were roughly equal.
NAT'L SCI. BD., SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING INDICATORS 8-19 (2000), available at
http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/seindO0/start.htm [hereinafter INDICATORS 2000] (last visited May
11,2005).
25. INDICATORS 2002, supra note 17, at 7-21. Gaskell and Bauer found a nine point
differential in support versus opposition and nearly 1:1 ratio between support and opposition,
demonstrating greater polarization than any of the other technologies. See supra note 21.
26. INDICATORS 2000, supra note 25, at 8-19; NAT'L Sci. BD., SCIENCE AND ENGI-
NEERING INDICATORS 7-13 (1998), available at http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/seind98/start.htm
(last visited May 11, 2005).
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substantial resources-including public and private financial, temporal,
and personnel costs-that could more valuably be directed towards other
problems, and retards technological growth. In short, not only do tech-
nology conflicts exist, they matter.
The technology conflicts analyzed in this Article are inefficient be-
cause mutually beneficial, social welfare-superior positions almost
undoubtedly exist concerning nuclear power and genetically modified
products.27 Nevertheless, these solutions are not achieved.
1. Nuclear Power
There are currently just over one hundred licensed and operating
nuclear power plants in the United States.28 All of these plants were built
pursuant to construction permits approved and issued in the 1960s and
1970s.29 Each plant received an initial forty-year license; many of them
are now at the end or nearing the end of their originally licensed lives.30
Following the initial forty-year term, nuclear plants are eligible to renew
their licenses for an additional twenty-year period." Scientists, engi-
neers, and the nuclear power industry contend (and it is not substantially
disputed) that better, more efficient, safer plants can now be built than
those that are currently in operation.12 Anti-nuclear activists' chief con-
27. "Social welfare" is used in this Article in its broad sense to refer to overall well-
being (not simply wealth) across all individuals in society. The social welfare-superior posi-
tions identified are not necessarily Pareto-superior because, as discussed below, a small
group of individuals may be made worse off. Similarly, the positions are not definitively
Kaldor-Hicks-superior because it is theoretically possible (though extremely unlikely) that
the "winners" could not fully compensate the "losers." The claim made is that, in the posi-
tions identified below, there would be so many individuals made significantly better off that
it almost undoubtedly results in a net increase in social welfare. The social welfare claim
thus has a normative component, which is the basis for the "almost undoubtedly" modifier.
28. U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMM'N, 16 INFORMATION DIGEST 38 (2003), available at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rmidoc-collections/nuregs/staff/srl350/vl6/srl350vl6rl.pdf (on
file with the MTILR) (last visited May 11, 2005).
29. Id. at 101-14. No new nuclear power plant construction permit has issued since
1978. Id. No plant has been built based on an order placed subsequent to 1973. Matthew L.
Wald, 7 Companies Band Together in Hopes of Building Nations First New Nuclear Plant in
Decades, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2004, at At4.
30. U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMM'N, supra note 28, at 52, 101-14.
31. Id. at 52.
32. See World Nuclear Ass'n, Advanced Nuclear Power Reactors (2005), at
http://world-nuclear.org/info/printable-information-papers/inf08print.htm; ("[M]any new
generation nuclear plants incorporate passive or inherent safety features which require no
active controls or operational intervention to avoid accidents in the event of malfunction")
(last visited May 11, 2005); Am. Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs, Nuclear Energy in the United
States-Recent Events, Major Trends, at http://www.asme.org/cns/ncsnews/nenergy.shtml
("[Aidvanced nuclear power plants contain many features that make them even safer.., to
operate than today's plants") (last visited May 11, 2005). Anti-nuclear activists certainly
contend that new plants are not safe, but that new plants are safer than old ones is not sig-
nificantly debated.
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cern, on the other hand, is that nuclear power is not safe, primarily be-
cause of the risk of a nuclear accident and the production of nuclear
waste that remains radioactive well into the future.33
A mutually beneficial partial solution to the nuclear power debate
would be to replace some of the old nuclear power plants with new
ones. I do not claim that this is an ideal solution for any party, or that it
is a complete solution to the nuclear power debate, only that it is benefi-
cial for (almost) all parties when compared with the status quo.
4 This
solution would benefit nuclear power proponents by allowing the devel-
opment of some new, more efficient plants. The solution would benefit
nuclear power opponents by replacing what are perceived to be the
riskiest plants with safer ones.3 5 Nuclear power opponents could even be
given significant say in deciding which plants to replace. The public at
large would be better off as a result of the efficiency and safety im-
provements. Social welfare would further improve as the resources
previously devoted by both sides towards stalemate on this part of the
nuclear power issue could be redirected towards more socially beneficial
36purposes.
Rather than achieving this mutually beneficial and more efficient
result, polarization and deadlock has produced a trend of renewing exist-
ing, old plant licenses for additional twenty-year terms.
7 Proponents of
33. See, e.g., Pub. Citizen, Nuclear Safety and Security, at www.citizen.org/
cmep/energy enviro..nuclear/nuclear..power..plants/reactor-safety/ ("U.S. nuclear power
plants have a concerning record of violating safety regulations while regulators turn a blind
eye") (last visited May 11, 2005); Union of Concerned Scientists, Clean Energy: Nuclear
Safety, at http://www.ucsusa.orglclean-energylnuclear-safety/index.cfm (stating that the
Three Mile Island accident exemplifies the failure of the nuclear industry and government
regulations to ensure safe operations at nuclear plants) (last visited May 11, 2005); Green-
peace, Nuclear Power: Expensive and Deadly, text available at http://www.greenpeace.org/
usa/news/nuclear-reactors-are-an-expens ("[T]he federal government and the nuclear corpo-
rations have developed the most expensive and dangerous means yet devised to boil water")
(last visited May 11, 2005); Nuclear Info. and Resource Serv., Routine Radioactive Releases
from Nuclear Reactors-It Doesn't Take an Accident!, at http://www.nirs.org/factsheets/
routineradioactivereleases.htm (stating that nuclear reactors' radioactive waste is released
into the environment, potentially causing severe health problems) (last visited May 11,
2005).
34. Achieving the proposal would require surpassing a number of practical hurdles,
including providing sufficient assurances to all groups, a detailed discussion of which is
beyond the scope of this Article.
35. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
36. See Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political
Influence, XCVIII Q. J. EcON. 371 (1983) (discussing the economic waste resulting from
interest group deadlock).
37. U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMM'N, supra note 28, at 52; see, e.g., Nuclear Energy
Institute, Nuclear Power Plant License Renewal (Apr. 2003), at http://www.nei.org/
doc.asp?catnum=3&catid=286&docid=&format=print ("The [Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion] has renewed the operating licenses of 14 reactors. It is reviewing license renewal
applications for some 16 reactors and expects to receive applications for 25 more by 2006.
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nuclear power are able to prevent opponents from requiring the shut-
down of existing nuclear reactors, and opponents are able to prevent
proponents from obtaining regulatory approval for new reactors. How-
ever, each side's polarized focus on opposition strategies prevents
recognition of mutually beneficial solutions. Because plant operators
can recapture certain years spent in construction and add them to their
licenses, old (riskier, less efficient) nuclear plants, built pursuant to dec-
ades-old construction plans, may continue to operate into the middle of
the twenty-first century, far beyond their originally licensed and planned
lives." This outcome is detrimental both to nuclear power proponents
and opponents, and to the public at large.
2. Genetically Modified Products
Genetically modified products are regulated in the United States
pursuant to an unwieldy hodgepodge of twelve different statutes, many
enacted decades prior to the advent of biotechnology. 9 For instance, the
primary statutes governing genetically modified crops alone include the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, enacted in 1938; 0 the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, enacted in 1947; 4 , and the
Plant Protection Act, enacted in 200042 (but which essentially consoli-
dated the Federal Plant Pest Act, enacted in 1957,3 and the Federal Plant
Quarantine Act, enacted in 191244). . The twelve statutes governing ge-
netically modified products are enforced by five different governmental
agencies and services.4 For example, the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) governs genetically modified crops and other food products, ex-
These 55 reactors are more than half the total number operating in the United States. Most of
the remaining 48 reactors are expected to receive renewed licenses as well.") (last visited
May 11, 2005).
38. U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMM'N, supra note 28, at 55.
39. Gregory N. Mandel, Gaps, Inexperience, Inconsistencies, and Overlaps: Crisis in
the Regulation of Genetically Modified Plants and Animals, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2167,
2228-29 (2004).
40. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (2000).
41. 7 U.S.C. § 136-136a (2000).
42. 7 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7772 (2000).
43. 7 U.S.C. § 150aa-ii (2000).
44. Id. §§ 151-164, 166-167 (2000).
45. The other statutes governing genetically modified products include the Federal
Meat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 601-691 (2000), the Poultry Products Inspection Act, 21
U.S.C. §§ 451-471 (2000), the Egg Products Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 1031-1056
(2000), the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 262, 264 (2000), the Animal Quarantine
Laws, 21 U.S.C. §§ 101-135 (2000), the Virus, Serums, and Toxins Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 151-
159 (2000), the Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159 (2000), the Health Research
Extension Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 201-300gg-92 (2000), and (perhaps) the Animal Health Protec-
tion Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 8301-8320 (2000).
46. Mandel, supra note 39, at 2228-29.
Technology Wars
cept for transgenic pest-protected plants (which are regulated by the En-
vironmental Protection Agency (EPA)) and genetically modified meat
and poultry (which are regulated by the Food Safety Inspection Ser-
vice), while the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service also
oversees the movement and field-testing of all genetically modified
47
crops.
Unsurprisingly, governing genetically modified products pursuant to
twelve statutes implemented by five administrative entities has led to a
system with numerous gaps in regulation, duplicative and inconsistent
regulation, and agencies acting outside their areas of expertise.
8 Some
striking examples of these deficiencies include the EPA's lack of author-
ity over, or involvement in, the regulation of numerous transgenic
products that could significantly impact the environment (such as crops
other than those that are pest-protected and all transgenic fish and other
transgenic animals); agencies using differing definitions of "genetically
modified product" to trigger regulation and imposing differing levels of
scientific review; and agencies reaching different conclusions regarding
the risk posed by the same genetically modified product. 9
Improvements in the structure of biotechnology regulation could
benefit biotechnology proponents directly by making regulatory review
more efficient and consistent, and indirectly by increasing consumer
confidence in genetically modified product safety (for instance, by har-
monizing levels of scientific review and conclusions regarding risk).
Improvements would benefit biotechnology opponents by closing regu-
latory gaps, targeting regulation at significant concerns, and eliminating
the problem of regulators acting outside their areas of expertise, all of
which would reduce risks to human health and the environment. The
public at large would benefit from the efficiency improvements and risk
reductions, and from the redirection of resources from stalemate to more
socially beneficial purposes. In addition, as the existence of deadlock
limits technological investment, research, and development,50 resolution
of this conflict would also improve welfare by allowing greater techno-
logical advance.
As with the nuclear power proposal, I do not claim that this is an
ideal solution for any party, only that it is at least beneficial to (almost)
all parties. Just as with the proposed nuclear power solution, however,
47. Id. at 2218-29.
48. Id. at 2230-42.
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., Andrew Pollack, Monsanto Shelves Plan for Modified Wheat, N.Y
TIMES, May 11, 2004, at Cl (discussing Monsanto's decision to halt efforts to introduce
genetically engineered herbicide-resistant wheat, and other genetically modified products,
due to farmer concerns about selling the product).
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polarization and deadlock preclude the proposed mutually beneficial,
welfare-superior results from being achieved. Polarization and deadlock
lead each group to focus on opposition and preventing the other side
from achieving its goals, rather than searching for and pursuing mutu-
ally beneficial outcomes.
The preceding discussion made the strong claim that more efficient,
social welfare-superior positions are available in the biotechnology and
nuclear power debates but are not achieved.5' Even if the suggested solu-
tions here would not fully be effective, what is most disturbing is the
fact that the potentially social welfare-improving solutions are not even
seriously propounded or discussed. The earlier interest group analysis52
and other studies53 reveal that mutually beneficial solutions to conflicts
receive minimal attention from interest groups, the media, and the pub-
lic. Technology conflict itself appears to create a viscous cycle of policy
paralysis that erodes avenues of democratic discourse, precluding effi-
cient and beneficial solutions to the conflict from even being
considered 4
51. Just because a "compromise" or "moderate" solution to technology conflicts is
more efficient does not demonstrate that such a position is "correct," or that polar or extreme
positions are "wrong," but rather that social welfare can be improved by implementing these
partial solutions, while allowing the right/wrong debate to continue on remaining portions of
the debate. See also supra, note 54.
52. Supra Part I.A.1. Of the forty-plus biotechnology and nuclear power interest
groups identified, no more than three even note compromise solutions; all three are in the
area of biotechnology. The Center for Science in the Public Interest, the Union of Concerned
Scientists, and the Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology take positions arguing for bet-
ter regulation of genetically modified products. None of these groups, however, focus on
improving regulations from an efficiency perspective to improve social welfare. See Union of
Concerned Scientists, Food and Environment, available at http://www.ucsusa.org/
food-and environment/index.cfm (stating that the group's current priorities include convinc-
ing the federal government to strengthen safety regulations for genetically modified foods)
(last visited May 11, 2005); Michael R. Taylor & Jody S. Tick, Pew Initiative on Food and
Biotechnology, Post Market Oversight of Biotech Foods: Is the System Prepared (April
2003), available at http://pewagbiotech.org/research/postmarket/PostMarketExecSum.pdf
(discussing the inadequacies of the federal regulatory system in properly accessing risks of
"postmarket" genetically modified crops) (last visited May 11, 2005); Center for Science in
the Public Interest, Biotechnology Project, at http://www.cspinet.org/biotech/ (stating that
keeping the public informed and ensuring that the U.S. regulatory system is up to the task of
preventing significant risk are some of the Center's goals) (last visited May 11, 2005).
53. Vraneski & Richter, supra note 14, at 252, 255 (analyzing multiple environmental
conflicts in Israel).
54. That a middle-ground solution to these debates would improve social welfare does
not indicate that a middle-ground solution is preferable for all polarized conflicts. In certain
conflicts, one of the polar positions may be preferable or "right." In the biotechnology and
nuclear power contexts, however, the preceding discussion reveals that mutually beneficial,
more efficient solutions are available, rendering the proposed middle-ground solutions at
least worthy of very serious consideration.
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3. Conflict Entrepreneurs and Hardliners
The efficiency analysis above may be critiqued by traditional eco-
nomic theorists on the basis that some individuals might be made worse
off under the proposed solutions. Theoretically, such individuals primar-
ily are those who have a particularized interest in the continuation of the
technology controversies themselves, as opposed to individuals who are
genuinely concerned about efficiency, health, environmental, or safety
issues. Individuals with particularized interests could include various
types of professional consultants or lobbyists who receive remuneration
for advocacy, or individuals in interest group leadership positions who
are concerned that their group may lose support or importance if a sig-
nificant part of the debate is resolved.5 Individuals falling within these
categories can be termed "conflict entrepreneurs"
5 6-they benefit from
the existence of the conflict per se, and therefore may try to perpetuate
it. As conflict entrepreneurs likely exist, one must evaluate whether it is
legitimate to press for a solution that may not be in their best short-term
individualized interest. The following discussion confirms that it is both
equitable and efficient to do so.
Arguments that it is equitable flow from both liberalist and commu-
nitarian/republican conceptions. A classic liberal perspective is that of a
social contract among private individuals, pursuant to which the princi-
ples and rules governing society are those reasonable participants would
accept and abide by.17 Under such a conception, individuals would be
expected to conclude that conflict entrepreneurs should not be permitted
to maintain a conflict for their individualized interest, unless it is neces-
sary to protect basic liberties or is to the benefit of the least-advantaged
members of society.58 Maintaining these conflicts cannot be said to be
necessary to protect any basic liberties, and it cannot reasonably be sug-
gested that the types of conflict entrepreneurs identified are among the
least-advantaged members of society. Communitarian and republican
concepts of justice, on the other hand, emphasize the protection of the
community and communal good. Common social goals should be
55. See Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2005) (noting that "Leaders of interest groups are always likely to have
subtly different agendas from those of their members"). That some such individuals may
exist does not mean that all, or even most, consultants, lobbyists, or interest group leaders
actually would prefer to continue the existing debate.
56. See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN.
L. REv. 1471, 1509, 1519 (1998) (discussing the concept of entrepreneur roles in other con-
texts).
57. See JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 5-7, 95-96 (2001)
(identifying this perspective of justice).
58. See id. at 42-43 (stating the principles of justice under a social cooperation con-
ception of justice).
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elevated over individual private interests. 9 Under these conceptions,
conflict entrepreneurs should not be allowed to perpetuate a conflict in
their individualized interest to the detriment of the communal good.
These equitable conclusions are supported by efficiency analysis.
Though the existence of conflict entrepreneurs indicates that the tech-
nology conflict solutions proposed are not Pareto-superior to existing
polarization and deadlock, and may not definitively be Kaldor-Hicks-
superior,' it still is safe to assume that conflict entrepreneurs are de
minimis in number in relation to the great number of individuals who
would benefit from the solutions. Similarly, on the face of it and assum-
ing the benefits to be derived from solution, the role of conflict
entrepreneur is likely internally social welfare inefficient-conflict entre-
preneurs can be expected to decrease social welfare through
perpetuating conflict to a greater extent than they increase social welfare
by individually benefiting from the conflict. For these reasons, the nor-
mative claim that the proposed technology debate solutions are social
welfare-superior is strongly defensible.
Another category of individuals possibly made worse off by the
proposed solutions can be referred to as "hardliners." Hardliners are in-
dividuals who do not have a particularized interest in the perpetuation of
the conflict, but who either (1) have developed such animosity toward
the other side they may disfavor a solution which is beneficial to all in
order to punish the other side, or (2) would support some solution based
on preference in the abstract, but oppose it out of concern that it may
make further undesirable changes more likely. Unlike conflict entrepre-
neurs, the former type of hardliners may be educated about their
concerns to understand that animosity may not be a sufficient reason to
deny an otherwise beneficial solution. Animosity is better understood as
a cognitive barrier to an efficient solution, rather than as causing a po-
tential reduction in social welfare.
The latter type of hardliner opposes compromise solutions due to
slippery slope concerns. A nuclear power opponent, for example, may
support replacing existing plants in the first instance, but be concerned
that if the replacement plants are successful, they may lead to additional
new plants. The validity of slippery slope concerns depend on the extent
to which the initial compromise increases the likelihood that further,
otherwise less likely, outcomes will occur.
59. PETER H. SCHUCK, DIVERSITY IN AMERICA: KEEPING GOVERNMENT AT A SAFE
DISTANCE 63 (2003); DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 44 (1991).
60. See supra note 27.
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Eugene Volokh has created a typology to categorize the five man-
ners in which slippery slope changes can occur.6' The following analysis
of these slippery slope possibilities demonstrates that such concerns are
not significantly warranted for the technology conflicts discussed here.
The solutions proposed would not significantly lower the costs of
potential further changes. Some regulatory change, for example, will not
lower the cost of additional change. One exception may be that produc-
ing replacement nuclear power plants could move along a learning curve
that would reduce the unit cost of additional new plants. Opposition to
nuclear power, however, is based primarily on risk and waste handling
concerns, not plant cost, so that even if this effect occurs it would not be
expected to lead down a slippery slope.
Because public attitudes already are strongly set concerning bio-
technology and nuclear power, it is unlikely that the proposed
compromises would lead to significant shifts in public opinion. Attitude-
altering slippery slopes are primarily a concern where most people do
not already feel strongly about an issue.62 Similarly, as the technology
issues discussed here already are high-profile, small, unnoticed change
slippery slopes are unlikely. 63 As the compromise solutions identified
above involve both sides winning something and giving something up,
they are not the type of change likely to lead to a change in political
momentum.64 Relatedly, because the solutions are unlikely to signifi-
cantly alter the financial or lobbying strength of either side, there is not
a significant political power concern.65
The characteristics of the biotechnology and nuclear power debates
make it unlikely that material slippery slope effects would result from
achieving partial solutions to the conflicts. For these and the other rea-
sons discussed above, hardliner concerns should be soluble.
C. Conundrums in Technology Conflict
Beyond their inefficiency and other social costs, technology con-
flicts reveal three conundrums related to scientific information
processing: increases in scientific knowledge do not lead to greater
61. Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026
(2003). The five types of slippery slopes are initial changes that could: (1) lower the cost of
further changes, (2) alter public attitude towards further changes, (3) proceed unnoticed if
small, (4) shift political power, or (5) shift political momentum. Id. at 1130.
62. Id. at 1081.
63. Small, unnoticed change slippery slopes tend to occur where only one side feels
intensely about an issue or where parties do not want to appear extremist. Id. at 1109-11.
Neither of these elements are representative of the technology conflicts discussed here.
64. Id. at 1131-312.
65. See id. at 1114-20 (discussing how political power may shift due to an initial
change).
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agreement on how to handle the technologies; individuals hold strong
convictions concerning issues they may not logically comprehend; and
interest groups ostensibly base their advocacy on science while taking
scientifically indefensible positions. Considering these conundrums
sheds light on the causes and cures of technology conflict.
Most technology conflicts (including those over biotechnology and
nuclear power) contain at least some issues on which scientific informa-
tion is pertinent. Science, for instance, may be able to provide
information concerning how much genetically modified crops will in-
crease yields or how long certain nuclear waste will remain dangerously
radioactive. These scientific issues, generally empirical-based, contrast
with normative issues, such as whether it is morally acceptable to ge-
netically engineer a living organism, which cannot be informed by
scientific information in a significant manner.66
As scientific knowledge about a technology grows, there should be
greater agreement among individuals regarding how to use and regulate
that technology, or at least about the consequences of use and regula-
tion. This does not mean that positions will become uniform-some
uncertainty will often remain and individuals may still disagree about
various normative aspects of the technology. Increasing scientific
knowledge, however, should lead to reduced divergence of opinion.67
This conclusion should follow to the extent that scientific information
plays any role in technology preferences for a significant number of in-
66. A primary distinction between scientific knowledge and normative concerns is that
scientific theories are falsifiable. KARL POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 17-20
(Routledge Classics 1935/2002). This Article, as a premise, rejects the absolute relativist
(solipsistic) position that there is no such thing as scientific truth. This premise is consistent
with the law's treatment of science. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S.
579 (1993) (treating scientific evidence as objective).
67. There is at least one important presumption in, and two potential exceptions to,
this statement. The presumption is that the new scientific information be based on scientifi-
cally generally accepted research (i.e., not biased or poor studies). I use phrasing like
"increased scientific knowledge" to indicate that this presumption is met. The first exception
to this rule is that it is possible that new scientific knowledge may debunk a previously held
common position, without demonstrating a replacement understanding on the same issue. As
a result, society could logically move from a position of agreement to one of disagreement
because it is no longer illogical to contest the now-debunked position. Though this scenario
undoubtedly occurs, it is relatively rare, and does not appear to represent the situation with
respect to the technologies discussed here. A second exception to this rule is that new con-
tradictory research findings could represent an increase in scientific knowledge that would
not be expected to increase public consensus. Though at first blush this may appear at least
partially to represent the situation with biotechnology or nuclear power, in both cases, scien-
tific consensus on risks and benefits has increased significantly over time. See, e.g., Mandel,
supra note 39, at 2179-2202 (discussing and reporting on scientific understanding of the
benefits and risks of genetically modified products). I am grateful to Peter H. Schuck and
Michael Saks for raising the points discussed in this footnote.
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dividuals. As uncertainties about a technology's impact decrease, public
opinion concerning that technology should tend to converge.
The ongoing debates concerning genetically modified products and
nuclear power defy this analysis; they demonstrate that the anticipated
pattern of increasing agreement does not hold. Despite a substantial
growth in scientific knowledge and consensus about each of these tech-
nologies over a period of decades, public opinion concerning how to use
and regulate them has not shown a tendency to coalesce around a par-
ticular solution (witness the deadlocked nature of public opinion
discussed above).68 This intractability, in the face of increasing scientific
consensus, indicates that scientific knowledge does not play a decisive
role in individual preference formation for these technology areas.69
Other empirical data support this conclusion: a study of individuals'
opinions concerning the risks and benefits of twenty-five different tech-
nologies concluded that, "Overall, the conclusion is compelling that
self-rated knowledge and perceptual accuracy have a minimal relation-
ship with risk perception."70 In other words, individuals' actual
knowledge about technological benefits and risks did not correlate with
their reported perceptions of a given technology's risks and benefits.7 '
These findings present one conundrum-increasing scientific consensus
about a technology does not necessarily increase public consensus about
the technology.
72
Further confounding the technology debate analysis is the remark-
able strength of individual conviction regarding support for or
opposition to many technologies. The literature on the safety (or lack
thereof) and beneficial tradeoffs (or lack thereof) of nuclear power is
vast and complex. The equivalent literature on genetically modified
products is similar. Few individuals possess the time, training, or educa-
tion necessary to independently review this information and rationally
evaluate for themselves whether either of these technologies is net bene-
ficial or net detrimental; such evaluation is far beyond most individuals'
68. See supra Part I.A.2.
69. Scientific knowledge sometimes can play a decisive role, as discussed below. See
infra Part II.A.2.
70. Aaron Wildavsky & Karl Dake, Theories of Risk Perception: Who Fears What and
Why?, 119 DAEDALUS Fall 1990 at 41, 49 (italics omitted); see also Susanna Homing Priest
et al., The "Trust Gap" Hypothesis: Predicting Support for Biotechnology Across National
Cultures as a Function of Trust in Actors, 23 RISK ANALYSIS 751, 757 (2003) (reporting that
differences in scientific education and knowledge are only weakly correlated to positions on
genetic engineering).
71. Wildavsky & Dake, supra note 70, at 48-49, 52.
72. The failure of scientific consensus about a technology to increase public consen-
sus about the technology is not universal. In certain circumstances, scientific consensus does
lead to public consensus. See infra text accompanying notes 132-139.
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capacities." Despite this apparent limitation, the vast majority of the
public has significant positions on these subjects. Empirical survey re-
sults consistently demonstrate that about three-quarters of respondents
or more either support or oppose each technology (as opposed to being
uncertain about it or holding a middle-ground position). 74 The number of
individuals holding strong views may be even greater because certain
individuals in the moderate position have strong views, as opposed to
ambivalent or uncertain ones. Such strong convictions pose a second
conundrum-individuals routinely form strong opinions without the cog-
nitive ability to have processed the information expected to form their
basis."
A third conundrum is revealed by a facial analysis of interest group
positions. Twenty-nine of the forty-one genetically modified product
and nuclear power interest groups (71%) promote the position that the
relevant technology offers either only benefits or only risks.76 Framed
another way, these groups implicitly contend that the technologies offer
either no benefit or no risk. These positions are scientifically indefensi-
ble. Without getting drawn into the technology debates, it is worth
noting that the following facts are not seriously debated:
* Certain genetically modified crops in the United States have
increased crop yields, reduced grower production costs, and
reduced pesticide use.77
• Allergenic proteins have been transferred by genetic engi-
neering between organisms; gene-flow between transgenic
crops and conventional plants has occurred."
73. Consider a common response to indicate that a certain problem is not difficult:
"It's not nuclear physics."
74. See supra Part I.A.2.
75. This second scientific conundrum bears a relationship to the first one identified:
that individuals cannot process complex technology information relates to why increases in
scientific knowledge do not increase consensus. This relationship is discussed further. See
infra Part II.
76. See supra Part I.A.l.
77. LEONARD P. GIANESSI ET AL., PLANT BIOTECHNOLOGY: CURRENT AND POTENTIAL
IMPACT FOR IMPROVING PEST MANAGEMENT IN U.S. AGRICULTURE 40, 55 (2002), available
at http://www.ncfap.org/40CaseStudies.htm (last visited May 11, 2005). For a broad discus-
sion of benefits and potential benefits offered by genetically modified products, see generally
Mandel, supra note 39, at 2179-90.
78. ROYAL SOC'Y OF CAN., ELEMENTS OF PRECAUTION: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE
REGULATION OF FOOD BIOTECHNOLOGY IN CANADA 55 (2001), available at http://
www.rsc.ca/files/publications/expert-panels/foodbiotechnology/GMexsummaryEN.pdf (last
visited May 11, 2005); NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF TRANS-
GENIC PLANTS 67 (2002), available at http://www.nap.edu/books/0309082633/html/ (last
visited May 11, 2005); NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, GENETICALLY MODIFIED PEST-
PROTECTED PLANTS: SCIENCE AND REGULATION 84 (2000), available at http://www.nap.edu/
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* Nuclear power is the only major energy source in the United
States that is emission-free and available for significant ex-
pansion.
79
* The partial meltdown of a nuclear reactor core at Three Mile
Island led to substantial remediation costs and to ongoing
human health concerns; nuclear reactor waste remains highly
toxic for tens of thousands of years.8"
In short, there is scientific consensus that genetically modified
products and nuclear power each offer certain benefits and pose certain
risks. What the full extent of the benefits and risks are, and how to bal-
ance them, may be hotly contested. The position that either of the
technologies offers no benefits or no risks, however, is scientifically un-
supportable.
Despite the majority of technology interest groups espousing posi-
tions that are scientifically indefensible, these same interest groups
ostensibly base their claims for or against a technology substantially on
scientific contentions." Interest groups simultaneously promote science
books/0309069300/html/ (last visited May 11, 2005). For a broad discussion of the risks and
potential risks presented by genetically modified products, see generally Mandel, supra note
39, at 2190-2202.
79. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, IMPACT OF U.S. NUCLEAR GEN-
ERATION ON GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSION 4 (2001), available at http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/
FTPROOT/nuclear/ghg.pdf (last visited May 11, 2005). Nuclear energy generates 20% of the
United States' electricity. U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMM'N, supra note 28, at 21. Hydroelectric
power is the next largest emission-free source, generating 7%; opportunities for significantly
expanding hydroelectric power generation are substantially limited. Id.
80. WILLIAM M. EVAN & MARK MANION, MINDING THE MACHINES: PREVENTING
TECHNOLOGICAL DISASTERS 269-78 (2002); Nuclear Info. and Resource Serv., supra note 33.
81. See, e.g., Alliance for Bio-Integrity, Why Concerns about Health Risks of Geneti-
cally Engineered Food are Scientifically Justified, at http://www.bio-integfity.org/heatlth-
risks/health-risks-ge-foods.html (last visited May 11, 2005) (identifying only biotechnology
risks yet making scientific claims against biotechnology: "foreign gene[s] produce a sub-
stance ... in an essentially unregulated manner that is uncoordinated with the needs and
natural functions of the organism"); Citizens Awareness Network, Potassium Iodide, at
http://www.nukebusters.org/radioactivist/detail?radid=5 (identifying only nuclear energy
risks yet making scientific claims against nuclear energy: "infants and children are most
vulnerable to radioactive iodine," and "at 10 miles, 70% of exposed adults and 100% of ex-
posed children are likely to experience thyroid damage") (last visited May 11, 2005);
Council for Biotechnology Information, Biotech Crops Raise U.S. Grower Incomes, Promote
Environmentally Friendly Farming, at http://www.whybiotech.com/index.asp?id=4718 (last
visited May 11, 2005) (identifying almost no biotechnology risks yet making scientific
claims supporting biotechnology: "genetically engineered [crops] increased grower incomes
by an additional $1.9 billion, boosted crop yields by 5.3 billion pounds and reduced pesticide
use by 46.4 million pounds in 2003"); World Nuclear Assoc., Energy for the World-Why
Uranium?, at http://www.world-nuclear.org/education/whyu.htm (identifying almost no
nuclear power risks yet making scientific claims supporting nuclear power: "the small quan-
tity [of hazardous spent fuel taken from a reactor] makes the task readily manageable") (last
visited May 11, 2005).
Spring 2005]
142 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 11:117
as an appropriate basis for decision-making concerning technology, yet
ignore scientific consensus concerning technology.
82
The above discussion reveals, in short, that individuals and interest
groups do not revise their technology preferences in response to scien-
tific and empirical information in the manner such information appears
to indicate. Non-scientific factors must play at least some role in driving
technology conflict. This understanding is revealed in the technology
context due to a difference between technology conflicts such as those
analyzed in this Article and other conflicts generally. Debates about
technology often can be informed by empirical scientific information
about the technology, for instance about its risks and benefits. In "more
normative" debates, science often cannot provide significant informa-
tion that would be expected to drive the debate.83 It is necessary,
therefore, to use the peculiar nature of technology conflict, as opposed
to more general conflict resolution principles, to diagnose the sources of
the conflict.
II. A FRAMEWORK OF TECHNOLOGY CONFLICT
Diagnosing the sources of technology conflict requires a multi-
disciplinary approach. The approach provided here weaves together a
variety of influences to form a four-part framework for understanding
technology conflict. This framework is first summarized below, fol-
lowed by a detailed analysis of each of its components.
The framework begins with how individuals form their initial opin-
ions or preferences concerning a technology. Where there is inceptive
scientific uncertainty concerning the benefits or risks of a new technol-
ogy,8 as with both genetically modified products and nuclear power
(and many other technologies), initial positions about the technology are
formed based on individuals' social and cultural worldviews. Individuals
develop their positions based on what the technology means to them
socially and culturally, and how they believe it will impact society, in
light of their view of the ideal society.
82. That the interest groups are acting in a scientifically irrational manner does not
demonstrate that they are acting irrational per se. Rather, the interest groups may be moti-
vated by various strategic or financial preferences to take positions that are scientifically
irrational. See infra, Part H.B.
83. See supra note 60.
84. Scientific uncertainty is routinely present in technology conflicts, in part because
such uncertainty often occurs in at least three broad levels in the technology context: uncer-
tainty about the scientific facts surrounding the technology, uncertainty about what the facts
indicate in terms of risks and benefits, and uncertainty about how to respond to those risks
and benefits.
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If scientific uncertainty concerning the risks and benefits of the
technology remains for a period, then these initial positions become
both polarized and deadlocked as a result of a variety of well-
documented behavioral, psychological, and social phenomena. Certain
of these phenomena tend to move individuals initially having only
mildly held preferences to more polarized positions. Thus, individuals
move from more moderate to more extreme positions. Other phenomena
tend to make individuals significantly more steadfast in their views, in-
creasing the deadlocked nature of the conflict.
Interest group advocacy also plays a significant role in technology
conflict. Technology conflict often involves various interest groups en-
gaged in a virulent battle over the technology, a battle that itself
compromises the conflict-solving value of scientific knowledge for the
technology debate. A central part of this battle includes publicized reli-
ance on one's own science and experts, and attacks on opposing science
and experts. The only consistent argument made by all sides is that cer-
tain science is not credible. This uniform argument causes a
destabilization of public confidence in science as a discipline because
science is no longer viewed as being objective. Individuals come to be-
lieve that science cannot be trusted, foreclosing a potentially promising
avenue for resolving aspects of technology debates.
The last major component of the framework is that a variety of be-
havioral, psychological, and social phenomena combine to dissuade
individuals, or groups of individuals, from actively advocating moderate
or compromise solutions to technology conflict. This occurs both be-
cause certain phenomena substantially reduce the number of individuals
holding moderate views and because other factors deter remaining mod-
erates or other individuals from promoting compromise solutions. This
void precludes compromise solutions from receiving full airing or con-
sideration.
The four major elements of the technology conflict framework are
thus: preference formation based on socio-cultural worldviews, the im-
pact of behavioral and psychological phenomena, the destabilization of
science, and the lack of moderate or compromise advocacy. The out-
come of the interaction of these elements is a technology imbroglio that
is inefficiently and unnecessarily paralyzed and polarized. This result
precludes resolution of technology debates through the standard avenue
of discourse favored in a democracy, and consequently precludes the
optimal use and regulation of technology.
The integration of these four elements into a single descriptive
framework provides a more powerful explanatory model for understand-
ing technology conflict than prior theories. This framework provides
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explanations for the various characteristics, conundrums, and ineffi-
ciency identified in Part I, as well as for additional conundrums
identified below. The framework, however, cannot be applied univer-
sally to all technology conflict-a certain level of scientific uncertainty,
such as exists in the biotechnology and nuclear power debates, is a pre-
requisite to its application.
The remainder of this Part examines empirical research that sup-
ports each of the four elements, analyzes how each element fits into the
framework, and investigates how the genetically modified product and
nuclear power debates are mapped by the framework. This reconceptu-
alization of technology conflict yields insights into the conflicts
themselves, and, perhaps most importantly, points towards novel solu-
tions for trying to resolve these and other seemingly intractable legal
and regulatory debates, including debates outside of the technology
arena.
A. Socio-Cultural Risk Preference Formation
The first element of the framework concerns how individuals de-
velop preferences concerning new technologies. As detailed below, a
wealth of empirical data demonstrate that individual technology prefer-
ences are not based solely on scientific or actual benefits and risks.
Rather, preferences are influenced significantly by individuals' cultural,
societal, and political beliefs and concerns.
1. The Cultural Theory of Risk Preference
Anthropologist Mary Douglas and political scientist Aaron Wil-
davsky established one of the early frameworks for understanding social
and cultural risk preference." They theorize that individual risk prefer-
ences are based on cultural beliefs and values concerning what a given
technology is perceived to mean, whether what it means is acceptable,
and how it is expected to impact society.86 Risk preference is functional-
technologies are supported if they are anticipated to instill the cultural
values and way of life that an individual desires, and weaken the values
and ways of life that are disliked.
7
Pursuant to Douglas and Wildavsky's work, individual cultural
variation concerning risk preference is assessed along two dimensions:
how strongly individuals should be bound by group membership and
decisions, and the desired amount of and variety of prescriptions on in-
85. See generally DOUGLAS & WILDAVSKY, supra note 23.
86. Id. at 8-10.
87. Karl Dake, Orienting Dispositions in the Perception of Risk: An Analysis of Con-
temporary Worldviews and Cultural Biases, 22 J. CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOL. 61, 65 (1991).
Technology Wars
dividual action and behavior." These two dimensions define four quad-
rants, each of which represents a different cultural worldview:
hierarchist, egalitarian, individualist, and solidarist (see Figure 3).89
FIGURE 3
CULTURAL THEORY OF RISK PREFERENCE WORLDVIEWS90
( Numberous & Varied Solidarist Hierarchist
.2 .
Few & Similar Individualist Egalitarian
Weak Strong
Strength of Group Boundaries
Hierarchists support traditional and institutionalized authority, and
will support technology where it is backed by expert or official author-
ity.9' They are most concerned with risks related to social deviance or
upsetting the social order, not with technological or environmental risk 92
Egalitarians reject social stratification, favoring a culture of voluntary
association and collective action. Egalitarians will oppose technology
and technological risk where it is perceived to impose human health or
environmental risks without volition, or where it may have a disparate
impact based on an individual's wealth, status, or power.93 Individualists
88. Aaron Wildavsky, Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A Cultural
Theory of Preference Formation, 81 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 3, 6 (1987).
89. Cultural theory also delineates a fifth cultural worldview, hermit. Because hermits
have effectively removed themselves from society and social relations, this worldview has
been little discussed in the cultural theory literature and is not relevant to the analysis here.
See, e.g., Ellen Peters & Paul Slovic, The Role of Affect and Worldviews as Orienting Dispo-
sitions in the Perception and Acceptance of Nuclear Power, 26 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL.
1427, 1430 (1996) (identifying a hermit as asocial, and not further considering it in their
study).
90. Adapted from Wildavsky, supra note 88, at 6.
91. Wildavsky, supra note 88, at 6-7, 14; DOUGLAS & WILDAVSKY, supra note 23, at
138.
92. Dake, supra note 87, at 66.
93. Wildavsky, supra note 88, at 6-7, 14; DOUGLAS & WILDAVSKY, supra note 23, at
139; Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A Cultural Theory
of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1291, 1297-98 (2003). This general analysis
will not hold universally. A technology expected to break down social barriers and particu-
larly advantage individuals with lower wealth, status, and power, for example, will be
supported by egalitarians and opposed by hierarchists. The internet may be an example that
falls partly within this category.
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support individual autonomy and therefore will favor self-regulation and
free markets; concomitantly, their greatest fear is market failure.94 Soli-
darists perceive that individuals have little control over what happens to
them, leading them to favor collective responsibility in the form of regu-
latory and social welfare programs for individual protection.95
Several implications flow from this analysis. First, no cultural
worldview is inherently risk-averse or risk-seeking in the abstract.
Rather, each worldview is concerned about particular types of risks.
Each worldview is expected to be risk-averse with respect to the risks it
is most concerned about, but risk-neutral or risk-seeking with respect to
other risks. Second, the cultural worldviews exist only in relation to one
another. An individual cannot be more strongly bound to group mem-
bership or social distinction without having complementary individuals
who are less bound. Cultural worldview conflict is a necessary antece-
96dent to cultural identity in the first instance. Third, no cultural
worldview is "best" or objectively better than any others. The world-
views represent competing normative conceptions about the ideal
manner of relations in society, and cannot be empirically shown to be
right or wrong.
The cultural theory of risk preference has been supported by a vari-
ety of empirical studies and theoretical analyses . The empirical studies
94. Wildavsky, supra note 88, at 6, 14; DOUGLAS & WILDAVSKY, supra note 23, at
138-39.
95. Wildavsky, supra note 88, at 6-7; Kahan & Braman, supra note 93, at 1303.
96. Wildavsky, supra note 88, at 7.
97. Wildavsky & Dake, supra, note 70 (concluding that cultural theory better predicts
and explains individual preferences concerning twenty-five technologies than various politi-
cal theories, personality theories, economic theories, actual risk knowledge, or a range of
demographic variables); Dake, supra note 87, at 70-74 (concluding that cultural worldviews
"are related pervasively and strongly with [thirty-six varied types of societal, technological,
economic, and environmental] concerns"); Peters & Slovic, supra note 89, at 1439 (finding
that "the egalitarian [worldview] was strongly related to concerns about technology and the
environment, while persons [with the hierarchical/solidarist] and the individualist [world-
views] ... show far less concern about these same issues"); see also Bernd Rohrmann &
Ortwin Renn, Risk Perception Research-An Introduction, in CROSS-CULTURAL RISK PER-
CEPTION: A SURVEY OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES 38-40 (Ortwin Renn & Bernd Rohrmann eds.,
2000) (compiling studies showing variations in risk perception among individuals from ten
different countries).
The above studies generally did not compare cultural theory to two other influential
socio-psychological theories of risk, the psychometric paradigm (or cognitive theory of risk
perception) and social amplification of risk theory. The basic psychometric paradigm posits
that individual risk perception is based on the degree to which a risk is perceived as dread
and unknown. Slovic, supra note 19, at 119, 123. The psychometric paradigm fails to pro-
vide an account for differences in risk perception between individuals generally; for this
reason, it does not explain the polarization and deadlock in the technology debates discussed
in this Article. More complex versions of the psychometric paradigm incorporate cultural
worldview into their analysis. See, e.g., Paul Slovic, Trust, Emotion, Sex, Politics, and Sci-
ence: Surveying the Risk Assessment Battlefield, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 59, 77-79 (1997);
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found that cultural worldview is a better predictor of risk perception
than many standard demographic characteristics, including political
party affiliation, political orientation, age, gender, race, religion, geog-
raphy, wealth, personality type, and education.
9" The theoretical analyses
conclude that cultural theory better predicts and explains individual
technology preferences than various political theories, personality theo-
ries, economic theories, or actual risk knowledge. 99
It is therefore appropriate to examine how cultural worldviews in-
fluence individual opinions concerning nuclear power and genetically
modified products.
Nuclear Power. Understanding and explaining attitudes towards nu-
clear technology was part of Douglas and Wildavsky's seminal work in
cultural theory.'m A study by Karl Dake confirmed that individual cul-
tural worldviews correlate significantly with perceptions of the "dangers
associated with nuclear energy."' O' Ellen Peters and Paul Slovic similarly
found that individuals scoring higher on the hierarchical/solidarist and
individualist worldview scales correlated positively with support for
nuclear power (.20 and .17 respectively; p < .0001), while those scoring
high on the egalitarian scale correlated negatively with nuclear support
(-.28; p < .0001).102 Relatedly, persons scoring high on the hierarchi-
callsolidarist worldview scale perceived the health risks associated with
nuclear power to be lower than egalitarians did, and were less likely
than egalitarians to desire control over nuclear power issues and deci-
sions. 10
see also infra note 152 (discussing the psychometric paradigm factors in relation to geneti-
cally modified products and nuclear power). Social amplification of risk concerns how events
pertaining to risks interact with psychological, social, institutional, and cultural processes in
ways that impact risk perception and behavior. Rohrmann & Renn, supra note 97, at 38-40.
Social amplification provides an integrated, holistic approach to risk. It is somewhat too
theoretical for application here and does not provide a direct mechanism to explain the po-
larization at issue in technology conflicts.
98. Kahan & Braman, supra note 93, at 1298, 1305-08 (finding that "cultural orienta-
tion scales have a bigger impact on gun control attitudes than does any other demographic
variable"); Dan Kahan et al., A Cultural Critique of Gun Litigation, in SUING THE GUN IN-
DUSTRY: A BATTLE AT THE CROSSROADS OF GUN CONTROL AND MASS TORTS 110 (Timothy
D. Lytton ed. 2005); see Peters & Slovic, supra note 89, at 1447; Dake, supra note 87. But
see Rohrmann & Renn, supra note 97, at 36 (citing studies, including Peters and Slovic, that
arguably did not find significant worldview influence).
99. Wildavsky & Dake, supra note 70.
100. See, e.g., Douglas & Wildavsky, supra note 23, at 139-51 (discussing differing
worldviews in anti-nuclear activism).
101. Dake, supra note 87, at 71.
102. Peters & Slovic, supra note 89, at 1439. The statistical analysis that Peters and
Slovic ran revealed three worldview factors, rather than the four theoretical ones. These three
corresponded highly with the individualist, egalitarian, and a blend of the hierarchical and
solidaristic worldviews described in the literature. Id. at 1436-38.
103. Id. at 1444.
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Genetically Modified Products. Cultural worldviews are expected to
influence the debate over the use and regulation of genetically modified
products as well. Opinions about technology and technological risk,
concerns about the environment and human health risks, opinions about
regulation, and concerns about the economy and market relations all
correlate significantly with worldview, and all are routinely raised in the
biotechnology controversy.
The following worldview consequences are postulated. Egalitarians
are predicted to oppose genetically modified products because the risks
the products are perceived to create are expected to be widely-dispersed
without individual volition. In this regard, the lack of an FDA require-
ment for government approval prior to commercialization of a new
genetically modified food product, and the lack of labeling requirements
for genetically modified food, would be viewed by egalitarians as par-
ticularly galling. Similarly, egalitarians would not be expected to trust
government regulatory bodies (or industry) to adequately protect against
the risks associated with genetically modified products. These issues, in
fact, turn out to be top concerns for genetically modified product oppo-
nents. 104
Hierarchists (and solidarists), on the other hand, are expected to
support genetically modified products to the extent the products are
supported by governmental or expert authority-which the products
generally are in the United States. For hierarchists, the lack of an FDA
requirement for approval prior to commercialization, or the lack of la-
beling requirements, are not a problem because the FDA is trusted to
have developed the proper regulations in this area. For solidarists it is
not a problem because they defer to the FDA's decision.
Individualists will tend to favor unfettered development of biotech-
nology due to their anti-regulatory, free-market worldview. Based on the
Peters and Slovic study, however, they may have some concern that the
104. See, e.g., Union of Concerned Scientists, Risks of Genetic Engineering, at http://
www.ucsusa.org/foodand-environment/biotechnology/page.cfm?pagelD=346 (last modi-
fied Oct. 30, 2002) (last visited May 11, 2005) (contending that risk assessments performed
on genetically engineered crops by government agencies are not adequate); Say No to
GMOs!, What's a GMO?, at http://www.saynotogmos.org (last visited May 1i, 2005) (noting
concern with the lack of labeling requirements for genetically modified organisms); Alliance
for Bio-Integrity, Biodeception: How the Food and Drug Administration Is Misrepresenting
the Facts About Risks of Genetically Engineered Foods and Violating the Laws Meant to
Regulate Them, at http://www.bio-integrity.org/FDADeception.htmnl (last visited May 11,
2005) (arguing that the FDA violated the FFDCA by allowing genetically modified foods to
be marketed without first assuring that they are safe); Michael F Jacobson & Gregory Jaffe,
Who's Watching What You Eat?, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, April 23, 2003, available at
http://www.cspinet.org/biotech/pdtake.html (critiquing that "companies can market geneti-
cally engineered crops without the FDA approving them as safe") (last visited May 11,
2005).
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government will not adequately regulate to fully protect the environ-
ment or human health. 05
Although empirical study has not yet focused on the relationship be-
tween worldviews and attitudes towards biotechnology, related
empirical data are available that support the above analysis. One item in
the Peters and Slovic study queried respondents on their opinion of the
risk posed by the "use of genetically engineered bacteria in agricul-
ture."' ' The results demonstrated that having an egalitarian worldview
significantly and positively correlated with perceiving this activity to be
risky (.18; p < .0001); having a hierarchist/solidarist worldview was not
significantly correlated with this risk (-.02; p > .001); and having an in-
dividualist worldview was negatively correlated with this risk (-.10; p <
.001).107
The data from a study of framing effects for genetically modified
foods, while not intended to investigate worldviews, also supports the
analysis. '°0 This national survey found that having a greater worry about
the United States' food supply or the environment (risks expected to be
prevalent for egalitarians) correlated positively and significantly with
perceiving greater risks from genetically modified food (.115; p < .01
and .073; p < .05, respectively).'09 Having a greater worry about the
United States' economy (a risk expected to be prevalent for hierarchists
and individualists) correlated positively and significantly with perceiv-
ing greater benefits from genetically modified food (.079; 
p < .01).110
Lastly, having greater trust in biotechnology companies (a view ex-
pected to be prevalent for hierarchists and rare for egalitarians)
correlated positively and significantly with perceiving greater benefits
from genetically modified food, and correlated negatively and signifi-
cantly with perceiving greater risks (.188; p < .01 and -. 145; p < .01,
respectively)."'
Cultural theory thus appears to provide a useful matrix for under-
standing individual technology preferences and some aspects of
technology debates.12 However, a more detailed examination of individ-
ual technology attitudes and technology debates demonstrates that
105. Peters & Slovic, supra note 89, at 1443.
106. Id. at 1441.
107. Id.
108. SILVA, ET AL., supra note 7, at 9-14.
109. Id. at 15.
110. Id.
Ill. Id.
112. For a related account of how individual positions are based on social and cultural
factors, see DONALD A. SCHON & MARTIN REM, FRAME REFLECTION: TOWARD THE RESOLU-
TION OF INTRACTABLE POLICY CONTROVERSIES (1994) (arguing that policy controversies are
the result of individuals' differing frames for understanding the issues).
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actual technology preferences are more nuanced and complex than cul-
tural theory predicts.
2. Critique of Cultural Theory
Despite cultural theory's descriptive and predictive strengths, it fails
to provide an adequate model of technology preferences in significant
manners: it fails to explain the polarization present in technology con-
flicts and it is not an accurate predictor of individual attachment to
views on technology.
Cultural Theory and Polarization. Cultural theory fails to explain
the polarization that pervades technology conflict because it predicts a
continuum of worldviews along both cultural dimensions (group
strength and social prescriptions). "3 There are strong hierarchists (indi-
viduals believing strongly in binding group membership and in
substantial social prescriptions) and weak hierarchists (individuals just
barely favoring being bound by group membership and supporting
some, but not extensive, social prescriptions). Similarly, there are strong
and weak egalitarians, individualists, and solidarists.
If everyone's worldview could be plotted on Figure 3, one would see
a scattering of data points throughout the Figure, rather than four iso-
lated bunchings located at the center or outskirts of each quadrant.
Considering that there is a relatively ideologically homogenous and sta-
ble society in the United States,"l4 and that the distribution of
individuals' positions along each of the cultural axes may resemble a
bell curve,"' it is fair to hypothesize that the concentration of data points
would be dense around some culturally-middling point (though by no
means necessarily at the intersection of the axes) and sparser at the ex-
treme edges of the cultural worldview matrix. Such a mid-point
concentration is antithetical to the demonstrated polarization that marks
technology conflict today. Cultural theory thus fails to predict actual
technology positions.
113. See, e.g., Steve Rayner, Cultural Theory and Risk Analysis, in SOCIAL THEORIES OF
RISK 83, 90 (Sheldon Krimsky & Dominic Golding eds., 1992) (explaining that the two di-
mensions of cultural theory represent continua of possibilities for individuals).
114. See PETER H. SCHUCK, DIVERSITY IN AMERICA: KEEPING GOVERNMENT AT A SAFE
DISTANCE 10 (2003) ("[T]he United States does appear to be more ideologically homogene-
ous than most other societies.").
115. See, e.g., Tierney, supra note 18 (discussing a survey revealing a rough bell curve
for individual self-identification along a liberal-conservative continuum). The bell curve (or
"normal distribution") is the statistical distribution that results from sampling a random
population; it represents the distribution of many natural phenomena. Individual positions
along the cultural axes may, but do not necessarily, present a normal distribution. Evaluating
the percentage of individuals holding various cultural worldviews, and more particularly the
distribution of individuals along each of the two cultural theory axes, would be a valuable
area for further study.
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Cultural Theory and Nuance. Cultural theory underpredicts individ-
ual attachment to technology preferences. In certain situations,
individuals seemingly act in ways that contradict their apparent cultural
worldview-individuals apparently fail to appreciate that different uses
of a technology may affect society differently.
Opponents of biotechnology (presumed egalitarians), for instance,
have criticized initiatives to provide "golden rice" (genetically modified
rice rich in beta carotene) for free or at cost in an effort to combat
worldwide health problems associated with vitamin A deficiencies. Bio-
technology opponents argue, for example, "golden rice is still a bad deal
for hungry people. People are deficient in vitamin A because they are
generally malnourished. Giving them beta carotene rice-even if it did
work-does not address the poverty and other social and public health
problems that lead to general vitamin deficiencies.
11 6 This quotation
appears unfathomable from a cultural theory perspective because even
as it disparages golden rice (with potential egalitarian benefits), it ex-
presses classic egalitarian sentiments regarding protection of hungry,
malnourished persons and a desire to combat the poverty and social
situations that cause these problems." 7
Biotechnology opponents also argue that the increased agricultural
yields and lower costs promised by biotechnology will not aid in solving
hunger problems because the problem is primarily one of inadequate
resources for the delivery of food, not inadequate food supply."
' Each of
these potential benefits would appear to aid the lower wealth and power
individuals that egalitarians are expected to be most concerned about.
116. MARTIN TEITEL & KIMBERLY A. WILSON, GENETICALLY ENGINEERED FOOD:
CHANGING THE NATURE OF NATURE 134 (1999).
117. Golden rice was identified by the non-partisan Copenhagen Consensus project as
one of the best means to combat malnutrition. JERE R. BEHRMAN ET AL., COPENHAGEN CON-
SENSUS-CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES: HUNGER AND MALNUTRITION 37-40 (2004),
available at http://www.copenhagenconsensus.comlFiles/Filer/CC/Papers/Hunger-and-
Malnutrition_070504.pdf (last visited May 11, 2005).
118. Biotechnology opponents argue, for example, that "[tihe real causes of hunger are
poverty, inequality and lack of access [rather than insufficient food supplies]." Michael A.
Altieri, & Peter Rosset, FoodFirst: Ten Reasons Why Biotechnology Will Not Ensure Food
Security, Protect the Environment and Reduce Poverty in the Developing World (Oct. 1999),
at http://www.foodfirst.org/progs/global/biotech/altieri-ll1-99.html (last visited May 
11,
2005). The United Nations and other food experts have concluded that though food delivery
is critical, food supply and enabling crops to be grown in currently inhospitable environ-
ments also will ameliorate the hunger problem. Andrew Pollack, U.N. Unit Sees Great
Promise in Biotech Research on Crops, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2004, at C8 (reporting United
Nations' position on the promise of biotechnology to ameliorate global hunger problems);
Ellen Messer, Food Systems and Dietary Perspective: Are Genetically Modified Organisms
the Best Way to Ensure Nutritionally Adequate Food?, 9 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUDIES 65,
69-70 (2001); BEHRMAN, ET AL., supra note 117, at 37-40 (identifying agricultural technol-
ogy as one of the best options for combating global hunger problems).
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Similarly, egalitarians might be expected to laud the potential for nu-
clear power to reduce the disproportionate share of pollution from coal-
fired power plants, and its concomitant detrimental health effects, faced
by residents of low-income neighborhoods.' 9
Inconsistencies between individual worldview and positions on par-
ticular aspects of technology are not limited to egalitarians.
Individualists are expected to support biotechnology based on their gen-
eral support for technological growth and anti-regulation preferences;
technological risk is not as salient for individualists as market or eco-
nomic failure. In 1998, the European Union countries placed a
moratorium on approving genetically modified crops, estimated to cost
United States corn farmers alone $300 million a year."' In 2000, Star-
Link corn, a genetically engineered strain of corn not approved for
human consumption, was discovered in human food in the United
States. This discovery led to large-scale corn processing interruptions, a
widespread recall of food products, and a sharp reduction in United
States corn exports.' 2' Despite the dramatic market impacts of the Euro-
pean Union moratorium and the StarLink corn contamination,
119. See Nuclear Energy Agency, Org. for Econ. Co-Operation and Dev., Society and
Nuclear Energy: Towards a Better Understanding (2002), available at http://www.nea.fr/
html/ndd/reports/2002/nea3677-society.pdf (last visited May 11, 2005) "[T]he combustion of
fossil fuels are responsible for the emission of particulate, nitrogen and sulphur oxides, and
carbon dioxide. The atmospheric pollution... leads to deterioration of air quality, and even-
tually of living conditions, especially in large cities. Urbanization trends ... are increasing
the share of world population affected by those problems." Id. at 21. See also Nuclear Energy
Inst., Nuclear Electricity: A Key to Sustainable Development 2, at http://www.nei.org/
documents/NuclearElectricitySustainable Development.pdf ("Historically, using nuclear
energy has promoted appropriate demographic policies envisioned by the Rio Principles by
meeting the electricity needs of concentrated population centers without contributing addi-
tional pollution or consuming limited land resources. Demographic trends show higher
percentages of the global population moving to urban areas . .. . Nuclear energy remains an
effective tool in crafting appropriate demographic policies as urban areas adapt to growing
populations and development demands.") (last visited May 11, 2005).
120. Elizabeth Becker with David Barboza, Battle over Biotechnology Intensifies Trade
War, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2003, at Cl; Bob Kemper, Bush Chews Out Europe over Ban, CHI.
TRIB., May 22, 2003, at C3. The European Union has since lifted the moratorium. Paul
Meller & Andrew Pollack, Europeans Appear Ready to Approve a Biotech Corn, N.Y. TIMES,
May 15, 2004, at Cl. However, recently promulgated European Union regulations, as well as
the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, that require labeling of genetically modified food and
feed, are expected to have the same effect as the moratorium. Council Directive 1829/2003,
O.J. L 268 2003, available at http://europa.eu.inteur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/20031_268/
l_26820031018en00010023.pdf; Council Directive, 1830/2003, O.J. L 268 2003, available
at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2003A-268/1 -2682003 101 8en00240028.pdf; Meller
& Pollack, supra note 120; Aaron Zitner, Sharp Talk on Biogenics, L.A. TIMES, June 24,
2003, at 19.
121. TAYLOR & TICK, supra note 52, at 90; Paul McAuliffe, Is StarLink Corn a Problem
for U.S. Corn Exports?, WORLD COMMODITY ANALYSIS CORP., May 8, 2001, available at
http://www.biotech-info.net/problem.html (last visited May 11, 2005).
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individualists do not appear to have significantly changed their level of
support for genetically modified products, as demonstrated by the rela-
tively consistent level of support for such products over the time period
at issue.
122
Individual responses to numerous events and particular technology
risks thus appear to contradict the cultural theory. Preferences are less
nuanced than cultural theory predicts. Individuals appear to support or
oppose a technology globally, rather than looking at particular benefit
and risk impacts, and how each may promote or retard each individual's
worldview. It may be possible to adapt cultural theory to fit these find-
ings, particularly since viewing a technology globally, without nuance,
is likely tied to risk salience and risk weighing influences, core compo-
nents of cultural theory. Cultural theory, however, is not consistent with
the demonstrated lack of nuanced preferences.
Cultural Theory and Preference Change. Cultural theory also over-
predicts individual attachment to technology views. Pursuant to cultural
theory, preferences should not change due to the development of further
scientific information concerning the benefits and risks of a technology,
because individual preferences are determined by worldview. This does
not mean that under cultural theory individual preferences can never
change, but that preferences only change where new information leads
one to reevaluate the impact of a technology on group relations or social
prescriptions. History reveals, however, that individual technology posi-
tions sometimes do change in response to greater scientific information,
even where that information cannot be said to affect the predicted cul-
tural impact of the technology.
This conclusion initially may appear to contradict the earlier obser-
vation that increasing scientific consensus about technology does not
increase public consensus about the technology. The earlier observation
was made with respect to biotechnology and nuclear power, but it is not
universal. Understanding why and when scientific consensus influences
or does not influence public consensus is a critical element in diagnos-
ing technology conflict.
A prime example of a significant shift in public opinion resulting
from scientific consensus that cannot clearly be explained by cultural
122. INDICATORs 2002, supra note 17, at 7-17. It is theoretically possible that the over-
all consistent level of support masks a loss of individualist support because individuals with
other worldviews increased support. This seems highly unlikely. First, no particular events
can be identified during this period that would be expected to significantly improve support
among individuals with other worldviews (to the contrary, the StarLink scenario would be
expected to reduce support). Second, as most hierarchists and solidarists already are ex-
pected to support biotechnology, the increased support would need to come primarily from
egalitarians, where it is unlikely to originate.
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theory is the shift in attitude regarding global warming and climate
change. Not long ago the question of whether global warming was oc-
curring was hotly contested.' 23 New scientific information and data,
however, have led to substantial scientific consensus that global warm-
ing is occurring. ' 24 The scientific consensus on global warming, in turn,
effectively ended the public debate over whether global warming was
occurring as well. Results from the National Science Board's 2001 sur-
vey found that 77% of Americans believed that global warming was
occurring and that over 85% believed that the possibility of global
warming should be treated as "very serious" or "somewhat serious.' 2 In
contrast, just four years earlier, only 24% of Americans were worried a
"great deal" about global warming.126 There is no indication that the
resolution of this debate was due to a shift in how individuals under-
stood global warming to impact group relations or social prescriptions.
This change in public attitudes is attributable to an increase in scientific
knowledge, not a change in cultural worldview.
Scientific consensus that a technology does not present a significant
risk also can change preferences. In the mid-1990s, as cellular telephone
use was exploding, reports surfaced about a possible causal link be-
tween cellular telephone use and brain cancer. 27 Not surprisingly, this
caused great concern among many individuals. A large number of stud-
123. Joby Warrick, Consensus Emerges Earth is Warming-Now What?, WASH. POST,
Nov. 12, 1997, at Al.
124. Il In 1995 the United Nations convened over 2,000 of the world's top climate scien-
tists in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to investigate global warming.
Id. The IPCC concluded that global warming was occurring, and put that part of the global
warming debate to rest scientifically. Id.; INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
CLIMATE CHANGE 1995: THE SCIENCE OF CLIMATE CHANGE (J.T. Houghton et al. eds., 1996).
The U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's administrator stated, "There's a
better scientific consensus on this than on any issue I know-except maybe Newton's second law
of dynamics." Warrick, supra note 123; see also Thomas C. Schelling, What Makes Greenhouse
Sense? lime to Rethink the Kyoto Protocol, FOREIGN AFFAIRS May/June 2002 at 2, 3,
available at http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20020501facomment8138/thomas-c-schelling/what-
makes-greenhouse-sense.html ("[W]hat is least uncertain is that climate change is real and likely
to be serious.") (last visited May 11, 2005). The causes of global warming, level of risk posed by
global warming, and how to respond to the risk are, of course, still highly contested. To place
this debate in the context of the three levels of uncertainty discussed earlier, there is now signifi-
cant consensus on the fact of global warming (the first level), but uncertainty remains on the
other two levels (the risks of global warming and how to respond). See supra note 84.
125. INDICATORS 2002, supra note 17, at 7-23. Precisely, 53% of respondents thought
that the possibility of global warming should be treated as "very serious," and 33% thought it
should be treated as "somewhat serious." Id.
126. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Innovations in Environmental Policy: The Psychology of
Global Climate Change, 2000 U. ILL. L. REv. 299, 315 (2000) (citing The Pew Research
Center for People and the Press, Americans Support Action on Global Warming).
127. John J. Keller, Are They Safe? Nobody Knows, But Studies are Underway to De-
termine Health Effects of Cellular-Frequency Radio Waves, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 1994, at
R13.
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ies covering thousands of people were conducted to investigate this
health concern. '2 As a result of these studies, scientific consensus
emerged that cellular telephone use did not cause an increased risk of
brain cancer.29 This change in scientific knowledge greatly reduced pub-
lic concern about cellular telephone use, a reduction that cannot be
attributed to a change in cultural perceptions of the impacts of cellular
telephone use on society.'30
In addition to debates over global warming and cellular telephone
cancer risks, technology debates as diverse as the risk of flying above
the speed of sound, the risks of DDT spraying, and the use of asbestos
all have been largely resolved as a result of increased scientific knowl-
edge. Scientific knowledge can influence individual preferences and
change debate discourse. Cultural worldview plays a significant role, but
it is one part in an ensemble performance. At some point, scientific
knowledge becomes strong enough that worldview preferences cannot
ignore it or brush it aside, and there is a shift from cultural divide to
greater public consensus."'
In sum, cultural theory's absolutist approach to risk preferences is
unrealistic in real-world technology conflict application. Individuals
cannot be neatly boxed in a four-worldview matrix (though recognizing
multiple preference dimensions is an improvement over the traditional
single continuum-e.g., from liberal to conservative). Similarly, cultural
theory fails to account enough for the influence of scientific knowledge
on preferences and discourse.
128. U.S. GEN. ACC'T OFF., GAO/RCED 95-32, TELECOMMUNICATIONS: STATUS OF
RESEARCH ON THE SAFETY OF CELLULAR TELEPHONES 3-5 (Nov. 1994), available at http://
www.gao.gov/archive/1995/rc95032.pdf (last visited May 11, 2005).
129. Id. 3-5; see also Scientists Find No Cancer Indications in DNA Study, MOBILE
PHONE NEWS, Jun. 17, 1996, at 3.
130. The reduction in the level of public concern about the health effects of electro-
magnetic radiation from high-voltage power lines similarly occurred as the result of an in-
crease in scientific consensus.
131. The characteristics that cause this kind of a shift likely resemble a tipping point.
See MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT: How LITTLE THINGS CAN MAKE A BIG
DIFFERENCE (2000). Scientific knowledge about a technology can build over a long period of
time, but as long as a significant uncertainty remains, cultural worldview preference may
continue to dominate scientific preference. At some point, a small increase in scientific
knowledge will reduce scientific uncertainty below a critical level, causing the situation to
tip. This small increase may initially influence only a few individuals, but due to the salience
of the particular information, the characteristics of the initial individuals it influences, and
the social environment surrounding the information, a cascade ensues, resulting in a signifi-
cant increase in consensus. Id. at 21-25, 139.
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3. Functionalist Socio-Cultural Risk Perception
Despite its inadequacies, cultural theory does help in understanding
technology wars, and consequently serves as a useful starting point for
understanding individual technology preferences. Technology prefer-
ences are influenced by social, cultural, and political beliefs and
concerns; risk perception is at least partially a social construct, not sta-
tistical law. Relatedly, risk preferences are functionalist-individual
technology preferences depend significantly on how an individual per-
ceives a technology to affect societal structures.132
This insight helps explain a variety of elements in actual technology
conflicts. Consider, for example, seemingly unrelated concerns about
genetically modified products. Some of the strongest criticisms of ge-
netically modified products are that they will result in greater
monopolization and industrialization of agriculture, with a concomitant
disastrous impact on small family farms and the public at large."' Bio-
technology opponents also frequently note concerns about product
manufacturers' ability to obtain strong intellectual property rights for
their products, about the potential impact of genetic engineering on
people with certain religious or other ethical dietary restrictions, and
about control of the food supply by large corporations7 3 Although none
132. See Rohrmann & Renn, supra note 97, at 34-40 (noting that despite cultural the-
ory's shortcomings, recognizing the influence of values and worldviews on risk perception is
a major accomplishment, and recognizing that socio-psychological factors have substantial
influence on risk perception). This conclusion is similar to that of Dorothy Nelkin. Dorothy
Nelkin, Science Controversies: The Dynamics of Public Disputes in the United States, in
HANDBOOK OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY STUDIES 445 (Shiela Jasanoff et al. eds. 1995)
("[certain] controversies over science and technology are struggles over meaning and moral-
ity, over the distribution of resources, and over focus of power and control").
133. See Greenpeace, Life for Sale: Cloning and Genetic Engineering, at http://
www.greenpeace.org/raw/content/usa/press/reports/life-for-sale-cloning-and-gen.htm (argu-
ing large corporations' ability to patent genetically engineered crops enables them to take
over the food market, force farmers to pay royalties, and produces giant corporate profits)
(last visited May 11, 2005); Earth Liberation Front, Biotech Out of Our Community! ELF
Claims Attack on University of Idaho Biotech Building (Jun. 10, 2001), text available at
http://www.skeptictank.org/ecowar/genO1126.htm (arguing large corporations force farmers
to sign contracts to continue to grow transgenic crops at the expense of public and environ-
mental health) (last visited May 11, 2005); Organic Consumers Assoc., Stop Genetically
Modified Wheat, at http://www.organicconsumers.org/wheat/ (discussing the negative eco-
nomic impact on small farmers of Monsanto's control of 90% of the U.S. genetically
modified seed market) (last visited May 11, 2005); TEITEL & WILSON, supra note 116, at 79-
83, 97-106 (stating concerns about monopolization of agriculture and control of the food
supply by large corporations, which wield their power in "tying farmer's hands").
134. See Earth Liberation Front, supra note 133 (contending large corporations are taking
over the food supply by patenting seeds); Friends of the Earth, Organic, Not Genetically
Engineered, at http://www.foe.org/camps/comm/safefood/gefood/factsheets/labelingfacts.html
(discussing religious and ethical concerns associated with genetically engineered crops, includ-
ing those voiced by Jewish, Buddhist, Moslem, and Christian denominations, and vegetarians)
(last visited May 11, 2005); Organic Consumers Assn., Label Genetically Engineered Foods!, at
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of these concerns is directly related to actual human health or environ-
mental risks, they are logically coherent from particular socio-cultural
perspectives.
The socio-cultural formation of technology preferences further
helps explain how the significance of additional information is mediated
by culture. Scientific knowledge is viewed through a cultural lens so
that individuals view new facts and data differently depending on their
social and cultural worldviews-'3 In certain technology conflicts, in-
creased scientific knowledge does not lead to consensus or compromise
because the debate is about culture, not scientific risk. Similarly, socio-
cultural preference formation permits individuals to form technology
preferences without the need for an in-depth, or accurate, understanding
of the technology's complex benefits and risks. 136 A technology that is
perceived to promote an individual's ideal society will be supported re-
gardless of its actual benefits or risks, and regardless of the actual
scientific knowledgability of the individual.
In short, socio-cultural worldview analysis can serve as a useful
tool, but the failure of this model to account for the salient existence of
polarization and non-worldview-based preferences requires that addi-
tional descriptive modeling be conducted to create a fuller, more
accurate account of technology conflict.
B. Behavioral Economics and Cognitive and Social Psychology
The second element of the framework considers behavioral and psy-
chological influences on individual preferences and decision-making.
Deciding how much to support or oppose a given technology requires one
to evaluate information and to formulate a conclusion concerning how the
technology will impact one's preferences. Empirical evidence from the
fields of behavioral economics and cognitive psychology demonstrates
http://www.organicconsumers.org/Organic/ov4.cfm (stating that the FDA's and USDA's lack of
labeling requirements violate many individual's religious and spiritual beliefs) (last visited May
11, 2005); Council for Responsible Genetics, The Origins of CRG, at http://www.gene-
watch.org/genewatch/articles/16-2hubbard-krimsky.html (arguing large corporations are mo-
nopolizing the food supply through control of genetically modified food seeds) (last visited May
11, 2005); Greenpeace, supra note 133 (arguing the patenting of genetically engineered crops
allows large multinational corporations to gain control of the food chain); TEITEL & WILSON,
supra note 116, at 92-113 (criticizing the patenting of living organisms and stating dietary con-
cerns).
135. See Kahan & Braman, supra note 93, at 1292 ("[Individuals] credit or dismiss
empirical evidence ... depending on whether it coheres or conflicts with their cultural val-
ues."); RAWLS, supra note 57, at 35-36 (contending reasonable disagreement can arise
between individuals because they assess evidence differently based on their individual ex-
periences and social groups).
136. See Wildavsky, supra note 88, at 8-9 (cultural preferences can allow "people who
possess only inches of facts to generate miles of preferences").
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that humans are not rationally up to this task. People do not, and cannot,
as assumed by traditional economic theory, always behave as rational
actors striving to maximize their preferences. Due to limitations on
time, perception, memory, cognition, and learning, individual prefer-
ence-seeking is constrained, or only boundedly rational. 137
Understanding flaws in the weighing of evidence, formation of belief,
and preference-seeking caused by bounded rationality are critical to
comprehending the causes of technology conflict.
A central finding of behavioral and cognitive study is that people
rely on heuristics to reduce complex analyses to simpler judgments.
When faced with a difficult problem requiring the analysis of numerous
probabilities, rather than engaging in a considered analysis of all avail-
able information, individuals rely on certain mental short-cuts to reach a
judgment. In general these heuristics are useful-one could not get
through a day if one had to carefully analyze every probability related to
every decision. In certain situations, however, basing judgment on heu-
ristics can "lead to severe and systematic errors."'
3 8
Decisions concerning whether to support or oppose genetically
modified products or nuclear power are extremely complex and detailed.
As discussed above, few individuals possess the training, experience, or
time necessary to analyze the benefits and risks created by these tech-
nologies to arrive at a reasoned conclusion regarding what position to
take. Given the impossibility of this task, it is not surprising that indi-
viduals rely on heuristics to formulate their positions on these complex
issues. Though use of these heuristics are valuable, they also can lead to
more extreme polarization and greater deadlock on technology issues
than would otherwise exist. The following sections discuss the processes
through which several well-recognized heuristics cause this result.3 9
137. For a wealth of literature on these topics, see generally THOMAS GILOVICH ET AL.,
HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT (2002); DANIEL KAH-
NEMAN ET AL., JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Kahneman et al.
eds., 1982).
138. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3 (Kahneman et al.
eds., 1982).
139. The following treatment of psychological phenomena that impact technology
conflict is not fully comprehensive-it is doubtful such a treatment would be possible. Various
psychological effects not highlighted in the following sections also impact these debates
(some are tangentially discussed). For instance, media and framing effects undoubtedly have
impacts on preference formation, and phenomena such as groupthink likely impact judgment
in these arenas. The phenomena discussed here, however, are those believed to have the
greatest impact on polarization and deadlock.
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1. Behavioral and Psychological Causes of Polarization
Several behavioral and psychological phenomena cause individuals
with initially only slightly differing views on technology to gravitate
toward more extreme, and as a result, more polarized positions. These
phenomena, discussed in turn below, include the biased assimilation of
new data, the affect heuristic, cognitive dissonance avoidance, and
group polarization.
Biased Assimilation of New Data. Various studies demonstrate that
individual beliefs are remarkably resilient to the introduction of new
data that challenges the beliefs. New data and information that would
logically be expected to lead to a moderation of position often is contra-
logically interpreted by individuals to strengthen their beliefs.
The seminal study in this area involved subjects who either sup-
ported capital punishment and believed it was an effective criminal
deterrent (proponents) or who opposed capital punishment and believed
it was not an effective deterrent (opponents). '4° The subjects were given
two purportedly authentic empirical studies, one supporting their posi-
tion, the other opposing it.'
4 '
"Both proponents and opponents of capital punishment consistently
rated the study that supported their beliefs as "more convincing" and
"better conducted" than the study that opposed their beliefs.' 42 In addi-
tion, the result of reading both studies was to polarize further the
proponent and the opponent positions on capital punishment. Not only
did reading the study supporting an individual's belief push the individ-
ual toward a more extreme position, but many individuals actually
became even more convinced of the correctness of their position
through reading the study that contained empirical data contradicting
their position. 143
Related research has found that empirical data explicitly refuting the
information on which an individual based his or her initial belief did not
lead the individual to fully discount that belief, as would be logically
140. Lee Ross & Craig A. Anderson, Shortcomings in the Attribution Process: On the
origins and maintenance of erroneous social assessments, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCER-
TAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 145 (Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) (citing Charles Lord et al.,
Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently
Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 2098 (1979)).
141. Id. at 145.
142. Id.
143. Id. The manner by which individuals become more convinced based on contradic-
tory information is complex. In the study discussed here, individuals tended to moderate
their views slightly when they read a brief result statement from the study opposing their
position, but upon reading the details concerning the data and procedure of the opposing
study, the individuals tended to revert to their original beliefs, and often moved to an even
more extreme belief. Id.
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expected.'" Beliefs, once formed, persist to a rationally unsupportable
degree, even after the basis for the belief has been discredited.'
4 5
These findings speak directly to the problems faced in trying to re-
solve technology conflict. Improving scientific knowledge about, or
educating individuals with greater scientific information concerning, the
beneficial and detrimental impacts of genetically modified products and
nuclear power does not help to build consensus concerning these tech-
nologies because individuals interpret the new information substantially
differently depending on their pre-existing beliefs. Rather than helping
to moderate positions or to build consensus, new scientific studies may
actually lead to even greater polarization.'6
The Affect Heuristic. The affect heuristic refers to people's tendency
to rapidly and automatically have a positive or negative feeling when
confronted with a certain word, concept, or other stimulus. 14' Though the
affect heuristic is often useful, it also can cause judgmental errors where
the substituted affective reaction differs from what the actual evaluation
would be.
Empirical evidence demonstrates that individuals base their judg-
ment of an activity or a technology, at least in significant part, on how
they feel about it affectively. 48 If individuals feel positively about a
technology, they will tend to judge its benefits as high and risks as low;
if they feel negatively about a technology, they will tend to judge its
144. Id. at 146-49.
145. Id. at 146-47; see also Emily Pronin et al., Understanding Misunderstanding:
Social Psychological Perspectives, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUI-
TIVE JUDGMENT 648-49 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) (noting that opposing
individuals interpret identical facts differently, each to support their own beliefs). The biased
assimilation of new data likely results in part from effects described by social judgment the-
ory, which posits that individuals can make a judgment about an item only by comparing it
with something else. MARVIN E. SHAW AND PHILIP R. COSTANZO, THEORIES OF SOCIAL PSY-
CHOLOGY 271 (2d ed. 1982). Individuals' positions serve as anchors with which they
compare new information. Where the discrepancy between new information and an individ-
ual's position is small (within a "latitude of acceptance"), the new information is assimilated
and the individual may move in the direction of the new information; where the discrepancy
is large (within a "latitude of rejection"), the new information is rejected and the individual
may boomerang in the direction opposite that which follows from the new information. Id. at
274-75.
146. The biased assimilation of new data has been identified as one reason that the
global warming debate appears particularly intractable. Rachlinski, supra note 126, at 304-
07.
147. Daniel Kahneman, A Perspective on Judgment and Choice: Mapping Bounded
Rationality, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 697, 710 (2003); Paul Slovic et al., The Affect Heuristic,
in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 397 (Thomas
Gilovich et al. eds., 2002). The latter authors use the example of the instant feelings that
arise associated with the words treasure or hate. Id.
148. Slovic et al., supra note 147, at 410-11.
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risks as high and its benefits as low.'49 As a result of the affect heuristic,
individual judgments of the risks and benefits created by a technology
correlate negatively, though such a correlation is not logically re-
quired.50 The affect heuristic has been found to influence both lay and
expert judgment of risk.
5'
The affect heuristic helps to explain why cultural theory "egalitari-
ans," for instance, will view the risks of nuclear power and
biotechnology as high and their benefits as low across the board, so that
even if certain aspects or uses of these technologies would promote
egalitarian goals, this will not be perceived. As a result of the affect heu-
ristic, the preferences individuals develop concerning a given
technology will be more global and less nuanced than is rational.
The affect heuristic will tend to cause polarization on technology is-
sues by pushing each individual's position away from a more balanced
position and towards a more extreme one. This occurs because individu-
als who view the technology positively and net beneficial (even by a
small margin), consequently will perceive the technology's risks to be
lower than they would absent the affect heuristic, causing the individual
to support the technology even more. The opposite influence will occur
for an individual initially opposing a technology, even only slightly.'52
Cognitive Dissonance Avoidance. Numerous empirical studies have
demonstrated that individuals have a hard time holding two apparently
conflicting ideas in mind at once.' The presence of conflicting concepts
creates psychological discomfort in an individual, leading him or her to
149. ld. at411.
150. Id. at 410-12; see also Slovic, Trust, supra note 97, at 81 (discussing how the
affective responses create an inverse relationship between perceived benefit and perceived
risk). The negative correlation persists regardless of whether the nature of the benefits of a
given activity are similar to or distinct from the nature of the risks. Slovic et al., supra note
147, at 410-12.
151. Slovic et al., supra note 147, at 412.
152. The affect heuristic has been identified by others as likely influencing individual
preferences concerning nuclear power. Paul Slovic et al., Regulation of Risk: A Psychological
Perspective, in REGULATORY POLICY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 241, 269 (Roger G. Noll ed.,
1985) [hereinafter Slovic Regulation]; Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analy-
sis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1059, 1067-68 (2000). Pursuant to the psychometric paradigm of
risk, an individual's perceptions of nuclear power and biotechnology read like a laundry list
of aggravating traits concerning risk. These technologies' risks commonly are perceived to
be: dread, uncontrollable, potentially catastrophic, fatal, inequitably distributed, place future
generations at risk, involuntary, not observable, unknown, new, irreversible, human created,
complex, and unfamiliar. See supra note 97 (discussing the psychometric paradigm); Slovic,
supra note 19, at 122; Slovic Regulation, supra note 152, at 269 (identifying how nuclear
power has many feared risk traits); EVAN & MANION, supra note 80, at 149 (discussing fac-
tors that affect public perception of risk); Sunstein, infra note 160, at 1078 (providing lists of
aggravating and mitigating risk factors).
153. See generally LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957)
(analyzing a number of studies and proposing the concept of cognitive dissonance).
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take steps to reduce or eliminate the conflict.'54 The psychological phe-
nomena of this conflict has been termed "cognitive dissonance," and the
motivation it inspires is "cognitive dissonance avoidance."
To avoid cognitive dissonance, individuals generally will not per-
ceive a given technology to offer both benefits and risks. Such a
perception creates cognitive dissonance because it implies that the tech-
nology is both good and bad. Individuals confronted with this conflict
will engage in cognitive dissonance avoidance measures, such as deny-
ing the existence of either the benefits or the risks, and actively seeking
and believing information that supports only one of the two qualities.1
5
Relatedly, once an individual forms a given belief about a technology,
he or she will avoid information that might contradict that belief, even if
it is reliable, in an effort to avoid dissonance.
5 6
Cognitive dissonance also may arise if there is a perceived conflict
between the use (or non-use) of a given technology and an individual's
cultural worldview. For instance, if an individual's worldview leads one
to believe a given technology is a bad choice for society, but there is
scientific consensus that the technology is beneficial and not risky, then
cognitive dissonance may be experienced.' An individual in such a
situation would be faced with two methods of cognitive dissonance
avoidance: changing one's cultural worldview or changing one's percep-
tion of the technology. The latter will be a far more attractive option for
most individuals, as it is less psychologically and cognitively imposing.
Cognitive dissonance avoidance will lead individuals to view issues
surrounding a given technology as black-or-white: either the technology
is beneficial or harmful, but not both.'58 Needless to say, such a result
increases polarization. It also further explains the lack of nuance in
technology preferences.
Group Polarization. 9 Individuals are social beings-they take part
in various social networks and frameworks and are engaged in both in-
154. Id. at 2-3, 18.
155. See id. at 6 (noting that a common method of cognitive dissonance avoidance is to
change one's "knowledge," such as by simply changing one's beliefs or by acquiring much
more knowledge supporting only one of the two apparently conflicting views).
156. Id. at 22.
157. See id. at 14 (noting that cognitive dissonance can arise as a result of cultural
mores).
158. Both the affect heuristic and cognitive dissonance avoidance tend to cause indi-
viduals to view a given technology as all benefit or all risk, thereby exacerbating
polarization. The processes by which each phenomena occurs, however, is different. For the
affect heuristic, it is the affect an individual associates with a technology that is the causative
agent. For cognitive dissonance avoidance, it is the presence of apparently conflicting ideas
that is the causative factor.
159. As discussed below, "group polarization" is a psychological term of art referring
to a particular psychological effect. Although the overlapping terminology is unfortunate, it
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terpersonal and intergroup relationships. Individuals are therefore ex-
pected to discuss their views with others, and these discussions may
impact technology preferences.
Deliberating groups made up of individuals with initial preferences
falling on one side of an issue have a tendency to make a more extreme
decision as a result of group deliberation than the typical or average
member of the group would have made on their own.'
60 This occurs be-
cause each individual's "initial tendency ... toward a given direction is
enhanced following group discussion."' 6' The effect of this phenomenon
is that intragroup discussions will lead to intergroup polarization as the
individual opinions in each group tend to become more uniform around
a more extreme position.1
6
1
To the extent groups of individuals with similar views on particular
technologies discuss their views with each other, group polarization is
expected to occur. It is expected that individuals with similar world-
views will often associate and discuss their views on technology issues
as prevalent as nuclear power and biotechnology. The advent of the
internet is likely to increase the prevalence of such association and dis-
cussion among like-minded individuals. Group polarization will cause
greater polarization between groups on technology issues than would
otherwise exist.
These four behavioral and psychological phenomena (the biased as-
similation of new data, affect heuristic, cognitive dissonance avoidance,
and group polarization) explain what the cultural theory of risk prefer-
ence could not-why individuals with only slightly differing
worldviews end up in starkly polarized conflict, and why individuals
appear to judge a technology globally and without nuance.
2. Behavioral and Psychological Exacerbation of Deadlock
In addition to causing greater polarization concerning the use and
regulation of technology, various behavioral and psychological phenom-
ena also tend to entrench individual positions on technology issues,
leading to greater deadlock than would otherwise exist. Phenomena
causing polarization are those that push individuals further from com-
promise or moderate positions, while phenomena causing deadlock are
should not be confused with the polarization generally discussed in this Article. As used in
psychology literature, "group polarization" is defined internally to the group in question, not
(as it is used in this Article) to a relationship between groups of individuals.
160. Cass R. Sunstein, Essay, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110
YALE L.J. 71, 85 (2000).
161. Id. at 85 (quoting Daniel J. Isenberg, Group Polarization: A Critical Review and
Meta-Analysis, 50 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1141, 1141 (1986)).
162. Sunstein, supra note 160, at 85-86.
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those that tend to make individuals more steadfast in their position but
do not influence individuals to change their position. Several causes of
exacerbated deadlock are discussed below: overconfidence bias, confir-
mation bias, naive realism and false consensus, and the availability
heuristic.
Overconfidence Bias. A wealth of empirical data reveal that people
have irrationally high confidence in their judgments. 63 Simply put,
"people are often more confident in their judgments than is warranted
by the facts." '64 Overconfidence is not limited to lay judgment or ex-
perimental situations. Various studies have found that experts often
exhibit an overconfidence bias, and studies of real world, professional
predictions routinely confirm overconfidence as well.' 65 The overconfi-
dence bias is extremely robust; various strategies employed to try to
reduce its impact have met with only limited success.' 66
The manner in which overconfidence influences deadlock is rela-
tively straightforward: individuals holding opposing positions will tend
to be overconfident in the degree to which their position is rationally
supported by science and evidence, and overconfident in the degree to
which contrary positions are logically untenable. This will increase in-
transigence as individuals on each side of the issue become strongly
convinced that their position is correct, and therefore less willing to
161compromise or consider alternative positions.
Some experimental data indicates the overconfidence bias stems
from a failure to consider why one's position may be wrong. '68 A more
detailed analysis of this bias provides additional insight into technology
debates. The persuasiveness of evidence depends on two factors, its
relevance (strength) and its reliability (weight). Experiments on judg-
ment have found people do not combine relevance and reliability
properly. Rather, judgments are overinfluenced by the relevance of evi-
163. Slovic et al., supra note 147, at 472; Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 138, at 17.
164. Dale Griffin & Amos Tversky, The Weighing of Evidence and the Determinants of
Confidence, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 230
(Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002).
165. Id.; Slovic et al., supra note 147, at 475-78. Overconfidence is not universal; for
very easy issues, underconfidence is routine. Griffin & Tversky, supra note 164, at 230. The
technology issues analyzed here cannot be classified as easy.
166. Cass R. Sunstein, Review, Hazardous Heuristics, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 774
(2003); Baruch Fischoff, Debiasing, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND
BIASES 432, 443 (Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
167. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Conflict Resolution: A Cognitive Perspective,
in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 474-75 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000).
168. Gretchen B. Chapman & Eric J. Johnson, Incorporating the Irrelevant: Anchors in
Judgments of Belief and Value, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE
JUDGMENT 134 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002).
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dence and underinfluenced by its reliability. 69 Extremely strong, but unre-
liable, evidence tends to be more persuasive than statistically appropriate;
weak, but reliable, evidence is less persuasive than it should be.
This differentiation may help explain the extremity of positions
taken by interest groups engaged in technology debates. A group oppos-
ing biotechnology may choose to argue that there are no benefits to
genetically modified food, but many risks. Though this position is unre-
liable and should be afforded little weight, it is highly relevant and
extremely strong. As such, it represents precisely the type of evidence
that individuals rely on to a greater extent than appropriate.
Confirmation Bias. Individuals tend to seek information that will
support their beliefs, take confirming evidence at face value, and inter-
pret information they receive as consistent with their beliefs.'
7°
Conversely, individuals are unlikely to seek information challenging
their beliefs, and when confronted with such information they are highly
critical of it and scrutinize it carefully. 7 1 This suite of findings has been
termed the "confirmation bias"-individuals are biased towards informa-
tion that confirms their existing beliefs and biased against information
that questions those beliefs.
7 2
Confirmation bias was strongly revealed in the capital punishment
study discussed above. It makes people more secure in their positions
than is logically justified, and reduces the likelihood that people will
perceive alternate positions or compromise solutions to be reasonable,
perpetuating deadlock.
Naive Realism and False Consensus. Similarly confounding at-
tempts to reduce deadlock is individuals' oft-held belief that their
particular perspective or beliefs are especially accurate. This tendency
has been termed "naive realism."'
73
Overcoming naive realism is particularly challenging because it
rests, in part, on a proper recognition that one's perspective has been
shaped by one's own experiences. Individuals simply believe that their
own personal experiences have been particularly enlightening, and
169. Griffin & Tversky, supra note 164, at 231-40.
170. Chapman & Johnson, supra note 168, at 133; Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S.
Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and
Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1093 (2000); Pronin et al., supra note 145, at 637; Ross
& Anderson, supra note 140, at 149.
171. Chapman & Johnson, supra note 168, at 133; Pronin et al., supra note 145, at 637;
Ross & Anderson, supra note 140, at 149.
172. Group decision-making also has been found to be subject to the confirmation bias.
Stefan Schulz-Hardt et al., Biased Information Search in Group Decision Making, 78 J. PEI-
SONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 655, 666 (2000).
173. Pronin et al., supra note 145, at 646-47.
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therefore render their position especially valid. 7 4 Individuals expect
other rational people to agree with their position once they are provided
with enough information. Consequently, the only reason someone would
disagree after being fully educated is irrationality.75
A related phenomenon is the "false consensus" bias, pursuant to
which people view their own judgments as relatively common (and
more common than they actually are), while viewing alternative judg-
ments as uncommon, deviant, and inappropriate.
76
The implications of naive realism and false consensus on deadlock are
clear. Opposed individuals firmly believe that their position is the only
rational one, and that others will be convinced of their position if they are
rational. As a result, individuals begin to view those with differing opin-
ions very negatively because they are seen as being irrationally
intransigent or unreasonably biased. 77 It is unnecessary, therefore, to seri-
ously consider opponents' positions. The result of these dynamics is an
environment that could hardly be less conducive to bridging deadlock.
The Availability Heuristic. The availability heuristic refers to the
tendency for individuals to assess the likelihood of an event by the ease
with which occurrences of the event can be brought to mind. 78 Avail-
ability can depend on many factors, including familiarity with the event,
salience of images, and how recently a relevant event has occurred. 79
The availability heuristic affects both expert and lay judgment; the for-
mer may be even more influenced than the latter. '8°
To understand the impact of the availability heuristic on technology
debates, one has to consider which images are available. This raises a
174. Id. at 646-47.
175. Id. at 647. Naive realism likely relates to another bias, the egocentric interpretation
of fairness, pursuant to which individuals perceive the solution that benefits them the most as
being objectively fairest. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Essay, Tragically Difficult: The Ob-
stacles to Governing the Commons, 30 ENVTL. L. 241, 260 (2000) (discussing how the
egocentric interpretation of fairness impedes individuals from reaching mutually beneficial
solutions to certain problems).
176. Pronin et al., supra note 145, at 642; Ross & Anderson, supra note 140, at 140.
177. Pronin et al., supra note 145, at 648.
178. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 138, at 11. A classic example of the availability
heuristic involves individuals asked whether there would be more words ending in "-ing" or
with "n" as their second-to-last-letter in a random sampling of an English novel. Individuals
estimated there would be more than twice as many words ending in "-ing," despite the fact
that this is logically impossible. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Extensional Versus
Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND
BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 21 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002).
Because it is easier to think of words that end with "-ing" than words that have "n" as their
second-to-last-letter, i.e., because the former is more available, people estimate the former
group to be larger than the latter. Id.
179. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 138, at 11.
180. Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of
Agency Decisionmaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 502 (2002).
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further question, as varied images are available for both biotechnology
and nuclear power. The thought of genetically modified food could
bring to mind either the StarLink corn fiasco or fields of unblemished
pest-free crops; the thought of nuclear power can bring to mind emis-
sion-free energy generation or nuclear reactor meltdown.
Several factors will influence what image an individual will bring to
mind when confronted with a question about a technology. Undoubt-
edly, two interrelated factors will be the individual's worldview and
affect toward the technology. An individual's position concerning a
technology will therefore be reinforced by the availability heuristic. Re-
latedly, the dichotomy of interest group positions on technology issues
also will further polarize individual positions, particularly due to fram-
ing and labeling effects. The vast majority of images made available by
interest groups are polarized ones; these are the images that will be most
available to most individuals. Similarly, interest groups work hard to
develop salient labels to support their positions (consider "frankenfood"
or "clean energy")."'
The availability heuristic bias can lead to informational and reputa-
tional cascades, further aggravating deadlock. An informational cascade
occurs where someone with little knowledge or opinion on an issue
bases his or her position on the apparent position of another.
82 Individu-
als are particularly susceptible to informational cascade effects when
they lack information on a topic.'83 This situation is likely to occur often
within technology debates where, as discussed, most individuals lack
the capacity to reach a rationally deduced position on their own. Reputa-
tional cascades occur where someone takes and expresses a given
position to earn social approval or avoid social disapproval'
M Either of
these effects can snowball (cascade) as individuals see more and more
people agreeing on a certain position. Critical for the purposes of this
Article is the concept of local cascades, in which a subgroup can be-
come increasingly convinced of its position, both in strength and
uniformity, due to these cascade effects." Availability and cascade
181. Not surprisingly, individual attitudes toward nuclear power have been identified as
likely being significantly influenced by the availability heuristic. Slovic Regulation, supra
note 152, at 487-88.
182. Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Controlling Availability Cascades, in BEHAV-
IORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 374, 374-75 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000); Sunstein, supra note
160, at 78-83.
183. Sunstein, supra note 160, at 83.
184. Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 182, at 375; Sunstein, supra note 160, at 78-85.
185. Sunstein, supra note 160, at 77; Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 182, at 375 (dis-
cussing local informational cascades and local reputational cascades). One commentator has
blamed informational and reputational cascades for "giving rise to growing and apparently
unfounded fears of genetic engineering of food." Sunstein, supra note 160, at 1067.
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effects may be enhanced by the aforementioned conflict entrepre-
neurs-individuals who have a self-interest in increasing polarization
and deadlock.
Interest groups routinely try to take advantage of the availability
heuristic and cascade effects to convince people to adhere to their view.
This is why Keep Nature Natural (an organization that seeks greater
regulation and labeling of genetically engineered products) organized
winners of the James Beard Foundation's Chef of the Year Award to
hold a press conference demanding mandatory labeling and pre-market
safety and environmental testing of genetically engineered foods;'86 and
why AgBioWorld Foundation (an organization that promotes biotech-
nology) lined up numerous scientists, including a number of Nobel
Prize winners, to sign a "Declaration of Support of Biotechnology"
promoting the development and use of genetically modified food.8 7
These organizations are playing the role of "availability entrepreneurs,"
attempting to cause informational and reputational cascades to influence
individual positions.'8
The availability heuristic and cascade effects will make group
members more convinced of the strength of their position, reducing the
possibility of breaking deadlock.
Almost any behavioral economics and cognitive psychology analy-
sis can be criticized on the bases that one cannot conclusively state the
impact of the various psychological factors, and that there are counter-
vailing heuristics and biases. Here, certain heuristics may reduce
conflict. The compromise bias and extremeness aversion, which cause
individuals to avoid choosing extreme outcomes, for instance, should
tend to reduce polarization and deadlock.'89 Nevertheless, it appears,
both in theory and in practice, that the overwhelming strength of behav-
ioral and psychological influences at work in technology debates tend to
increase polarization and deadlock. Resolving technology conflicts,
therefore, becomes even more complex and challenging.
186. Press Release, Top Chefs Add Their Voices to "Keep Nature Natural" (May 10,
2000), at http://mindfully.org/GE/Chefs-Join-Effort.htm (last visited May 11, 2005).
187. AgBioWorld Foundation, Scientists in Support of Agricultural Biotechnology, at
http://www.agbioworld.org/declaration/declarationindex.html (last visited May 11, 2005);
see Nelkin, supra note 132, at 454 (discussing efforts of interest groups to attract public
attention and political interest).
188. See Jolls et al., supra note 56, at 1509, 1519 (discussing the concept of an avail-
ability entrepreneur).
189. See Seidenfeld, supra note 180, at 506 (describing the compromise bias and ex-
tremeness aversion).
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Considering the weight of biases that inhibit compromise agree-
ments, it may be considered surprising that consensus is ever achieved.
That consensus is achieved demonstrates that scientific knowledge can
play a significant role in preference formation, and can break down psy-
chological barriers and lead to agreement, as discussed further below.
'90
C. The Destabilization of Science
One of the central puzzles present in technology debates is why
greater scientific consensus often does not lead to greater agreement
over time. Science sometimes plays only a minor role in driving tech-
nology debates-witness the consistency of positions over decades in the
biotechnology and nuclear power conflicts despite vast increases in sci-
entific knowledge. At other times, however, science reaches a tipping
point and substantially changes debate discourse-witness the debates
over whether global warming is occurring and whether cellular tele-
phone use causes brain cancer.'9' The effects of socio-cultural
worldviews on preferences, and the behavioral and psychological phe-
nomena discussed above, explain part of this puzzle. The impact of
polarization itself on individual attitudes towards science also limits the
ability of scientific knowledge to help resolve technology conflicts.
Earlier work has revealed that polarized interest groups have a natu-
ral tendency to destabilize public trust in science, often
unintentionally.9 2 This destabilization occurs because each interest
group holds fast to its position and decries every other position as un-
reasonable. Each side marshals and publicizes a wealth of reports,
scientists, and other figures to trumpet its position and attack that of its
opponents. This battle takes place in all variety of media-press re-
leases, website wars, celebrity spokespeople, and radio and television
interviews. The competing actions of Keep Nature Natural and AgBio-
World Foundation discussed earlier provide a prime example.'
93 For the
same reason, various groups have trumpeted Prince Charles' position
190. See infra Part III. The degree to which the various psychological influences inhibit
agreement is not innate or fixed, depending, for instance, on various cultural and social fac-
tors. We may be particularly susceptible to such a divide in the United States right now due
to socialization of individuals to be very opinionated and view many issues in binary per-
spectives.
191. Supra Part II.A.2.
192. Gregory N. Mandel, Building Confidence through Teamwork on Regulatory Pro-
posals: The Genetically Modified Product Model, 44 JURIMETRICS J. 41, 47-49 (2003). The
following discussion draws from this article.
193. See supra notes 186-187 and accompanying text.
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against the introduction of transgenic crops and President Carter's sup-
port for genetically modified food.94
This mass of information and massive effort generally does little to
change existing views. Rather, the polarized propaganda storm confuses
the public, as most individuals are incapable of independently judging
the science at issue and cannot determine which position is most rea-
sonable or accurate. '9' The polarized debate erodes public trust in
scientific knowledge itself because the one consistent argument asserted
by every interest group is that opposing interest groups' science cannot
be trusted. Many individuals will reason that the institution of science is
not all it is claimed to be. After all, how can two members of a disci-
pline allegedly based on rigorous methodology and objectivity reach
contrary conclusions on the same issue? The consequence of the interest
group assault on opposing scientific claims is that individuals will con-
clude that science, as a discipline, cannot be trusted. 96 Once this trust is
eroded, it is very difficult to regain. 197
The result of most interest groups taking an "all benefit, no risk" or
"all risk, no benefit" position is thus severe. These positions help to ef-
fectuate the destabilization of science that occurs in technology debates.
The diametrically conflicting positions taken by interest groups assault
science as a discipline to such an extent that individuals find it impossi-
ble to assess or accept the merits of any scientific position. Individuals
therefore discount the value of science as an objective means for resolv-
ing the conflict at issue. They begin instead to view scientific
194. See also SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFrH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISORS AS POLICY-
MAKERS 37 (1990) ("[I]n a politicized environment... the deconstruction of scientific 'facts'
into conflicting, socially constrained interpretations seems more likely to be the norm than
the exception.").
195. Mandel, supra note 192, at 48; Ortwin Renn, The Social Arena Concept of Risk
Debates, in SOCIAL THEORIES OF RISK 179, 192 (Sheldon Krimsky & Dominic Golding eds.,
1992). A stark example of individuals' judgmental inabilities relevant to the technology is-
sues discussed here is a survey study in which approximately half of the respondents
answered (incorrectly) that it was true that "ordinary tomatoes do not contain genes, while
genetically modified tomatoes do." INDICATORS 2002, supra note 17, at 7-21 to 7-22.
196. Mandel, supra note 192, at 48-49; Rohrmann & Renn, supra note 97, at 192;
Slovic, supra note 97, at 93 (describing how conflicts among experts destroy the public
trust). The circumstances discussed here, in which people do not rely on science even though
science may provide certain relevant and reliable information, may be juxtaposed with other
situations in which decision-makers use pseudo-scientific arguments to support what is actu-
ally a non-scientific policy decision. See Mandel, supra note 4 (discussing this
phenomenon).
197. Wendy E. Wagner, The "Bad Science" Fiction: Reclaiming the Debate over the
Role of Science in Public Health and Environmental Regulation, 66:4 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. Autumn 2003 at 63, 106 (citing PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 316, 317
(2000)); Slovic, supra note 97, at 87-93.
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information as no more objective than value-based normative opinion.'"
As a result, increased scientific knowledge often fails to increase con-
sensus, and technology debates remain paralyzed.
As long as a significant degree of scientific uncertainty about a
technology remains and interest groups advocate polarly opposed view-
points, destabilization will continue. Scientific uncertainty of several
kinds is often present when dealing with technological issues. First,
technology debates usually take place at the forefront of scientific un-
derstanding, where almost by definition there is not complete
knowledge. Second, technology debates often concern issues of risk.
Even if a risk hypothetically could be completely characterized there
still would be uncertainty about who it would affect, how, and when,
among other issues. Third, even if the risks' impacts were known, there
would be uncertainty about how to respond to those risks. Finally, as
scientists are trained to use caution in discussing their findings, indi-
viduals often will perceive even greater uncertainty than is actually
present.' 99 The circumstances surrounding technology debates thus make
the destabilization of science almost inevitable.
Conflict entrepreneurs exacerbate the destabilization of science by
actively encouraging and promoting it. As conflict entrepreneurs desire
continued conflict, they will try to enhance destabilizing tendencies to
the extent they are recognized. Taking a scientifically indefensible posi-
tion therefore may be a strategic behavior aimed directly at entrenching
conflict, not resolving debate, even if resolution would be socially bene-
ficial.
The destabilization of science is closely tied to the politicization of
science. Destabilization causes individuals to view scientific statements
merely as statements of opinion, value, or belief. Scientific knowledge and
information are therefore entitled no special weight or strength. As a re-
sult, politicians and others involved in political and social debate are free,
in the extreme, to interpret science to support any position.9 Since tech-
nology debates almost necessarily take place in an arena of scientific
198. Mandel, supra note 192, at 49. The problem of polarized interest groups destabi-
lizing science is somewhat analogous to the battle of experts that occurs in courtroom
litigation. Often the result of fact-finders hearing polar, conflicting scientific expert testi-
mony is not that one side's experts are accepted as accurate and the other side's experts are
perceived to be quacks, but that the fact-finder gives up on using science as a means to re-
solve the case and turns to other factors to evaluate the case. Id.
199. Thompson, supra note 175, at 258. That people perceive uncertainty also may
make them more susceptible to the influence of informational and reputational cascades. See
id. at 259 (noting that individuals may look to others in the face of ambiguity).
200. See Nelkin, supra note 132, at 453 ("as technical expertise becomes a resource,
exploited by all parties to justify competing moral and political claims, it becomes difficult
to distinguish scientific facts from political values"); Wagner, supra note 197, at 88, 93-94
(discussing the political deconstruction of science and scientific knowledge).
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uncertainty, the destabilization and politicization of science occurs rou-
tinely, further exacerbating conflict paralysis.
D. Lack of Compromise Advocacy
The fourth element of the technology conflict framework concerns
the paucity of individuals advocating moderate or compromise positions
in technology debates. An active, vocal group of individuals supporting
such positions would likely ameliorate the conflicts and increase the
probability of a compromise solution being achieved. This type of
group, however, usually does not exist.
As the interest group study reported in Part I revealed, only two of
the forty-plus interest groups hold what could be considered moderate
positions. Similarly, the substantial majority of individuals do not hold
moderate positions on genetically modified products or nuclear power.
The discussion of behavioral and psychological influences which tend to
cause polarization helps explain why few individuals hold moderate po-
sitions or advocate compromise solutions. Additional phenomena also
preclude individuals from organizing or strongly advocating for com-
promise solutions to technology conflicts.
First, proposals from the middle are likely to be criticized and cri-
tiqued from both extremes, who together outnumber the middle by
three-to-one or more in the debates discussed here. 20 ' Though the ex-
treme groups also criticize each other, these sides are roughly equally
represented.2 0 2 Further, individuals advocating moderate positions often
receive attacks from both sides for being traitors or "gutless, spineless,
passionless, malleable, and shameless shills for the 'other side,' ' 20 3 at-
tacks that discourage them from getting involved in the conflict. These
same influences also deter individuals in the polar positions from offer-
ing compromises.
Second, as long as the two extremes are of relatively equal strength,
there may be a rational incentive for moderate individuals to remain on
the sideline. Each polar group is likely to preclude the other from
achieving extreme ends, rendering unlikely a result that is wholly dis-
tasteful to most moderates. For this reason, individuals with moderate
positions may rationally decide that it is preferable to devote their re-
sources to pursuing other preference goals, ones that they may face less
of an uphill, nasty battle to achieve. Individual decisions not to organize
to strongly advocate compromise positions in this view are efficient,
utility-maximizing decisions.
201. See supra Part I.A.2.
202. See supra Part I.A.2.
203. J.B. RuhI, A Manifesto for the Radical Middle, 38 IDAHO L. REv. 385, 386 (2002).
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Third, those holding a moderate position on a given technology are
likely a less organized, more diffuse group than those holding more ex-
treme positions-moderates are not clearly unified around a particular
cause. Public choice theory teaches that the positions of attenuated
groups are likely to be underrepresented in decision making fora, while
positions of more compact and potentially impacted groups are likely to
be overrepresented.2 4
Fourth, the lack of a vocal middle also may be attributable to certain
heuristics, such as the status quo and omission biases. Most individuals
exhibit a status quo bias-they prefer to keep things as they are, even if
another position appears to improve their overall well-being. 25 The
omission bias, also well-supported experimentally, refers to individuals'
tendency to consider harmful commission (positive action) to be worse
than equally harmful omission (inaction).2l Individuals holding middle
positions may often lack the necessary inertia to overcome the status
quo and omission biases to advocate for proactive change.
It is worth noting that simply because compromise positions are not
vocally advocated does not demonstrate that these positions are unsup-
ported. Rather, there may not be enough moderate individuals who are
willing to be the first to step forward (the "instigators") to initiate more
widespread moderate collective behavior. 7 Models of collective behav-
ior, as well as the earlier analysis of cascade effects, indicate that the
expression of collective action and opinion often depends on the pres-
ence of some initial instigators. 208 If these instigators are not present in
sufficient numbers, then larger scale collective behavior that would oth-
erwise take place will not occur. It is plausible that individuals holding
moderate positions in a given technology conflict may have personality
characteristics that tend to make them less likely to take on the role of
204. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 59, at 72. 153 ("[Dliffuse groups will gener-
ally find it difficult to obtain legislation that benefits them at the expense of more compact
groups, even where the legislation creates much greater benefits than costs.").
205. Kahneman, supra note 147, at 705; Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices,
Values, and Frames, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 3 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tver-
sky eds., 2000); Jolls et al., supra note 56, at 1535-36. Loss aversion and the status quo bias
have been identified as psychological barriers to parties reaching agreement over various
environmental and technological issues. See Thompson, supra note 175, at 256 (identifying
loss aversion as a barrier to solving tragedy of the commons problems, including global
warming and climate change); Rachlinski, supra note 126, at 307-11 (identifying loss aver-
sion and the status quo bias as a barrier to solving the global climate change debate).
206. JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 400 (3d ed. 2000).
207. Mark Granovetter, Threshold Models of Collective Behavior, 83 AM. J. Soc'Y
1420, 1420 (1978).
208. See id. at 1424-28 (discussing how slight changes in individual dispositions to-
wards action can have dramatic effects on the aggregation of collective behavior and action);
supra Part II.B.2 (discussing cascade effects).
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instigator. In other words, moderates often may be underrepresented in
technology conflicts because individuals holding these views tend to be
individuals who do not incite similarly-viewed persons to collective ac-
tion. The end result is that the moderate voice effectively silences itself;
it does not achieve the momentum to speak out in the first instance.
That two extreme groups will stalemate each other, however, does
not indicate that an optimal equilibrium position will be achieved. In
particular, the end result may be an eclectic solution that benefits special
interests to some extent, but is both irrational and inefficient from a so-
cial-welfare perspective.0 Nevertheless, the disincentives discussed
above often preclude moderates from entering the fray to push actively
for an equitable and efficient compromise agenda.
III. BRIDGING TECHNOLOGY CONFLICT
The foregoing analysis presents the four major elements of the tech-
nology conflict framework. As the analysis demonstrates, none of the
elements independently explains the characteristics found in polarized
technology debates. Combining the elements into an integrated whole,
however, yields a substantially more powerful descriptive framework.
The framework works as follows. When an individual is confronted
with an issue concerning the regulation or use of a new technology, on
which there is a significant degree of scientific uncertainty, 210 initial
views form in a functionalist manner, pursuant to an individual's socio-
cultural preferences. An individual evaluates the technology to estimate
its likely effects on society and develops initial preferences based on
209. SCH6N & REM, supra note 112, at 9 (noting that intractable policy controversies
lead to suboptimal policy compromises); Ruhl, supra note 203, at 387 (noting that the result
of a passive middle in environmental debates often leads to a "mish-mash that neither of the
warring sides wanted and the middle had no hand in crafting"); Sheldon W. Halpern, The Art
of Compromise and Compromising Art: Copyright, Technology, and the Arts, 50 J. Copy-
RIGHT SOC'Y U.S. 273, 293 (2003) (noting that compromise solutions of interested party
negotiations have only a tangential relationship to the public good); see also THE FEDERAL-
IST No. 10 (James Madison) (arguing that representative democracy can protect individuals
and the general public welfare from the self-interested demands of factions).
210. Uncertainty concerning a technology's impact, and risk related to the uncertainty,
are necessary prerequisites to the application of the framework. In the absence of uncertainty
and risk, individuals are expected to substantially support the technology, and there will not
be a conflict over its regulation and use. The internet provides a partial example in this re-
gard. There are no more than de minimis concerns about the human health and environmental
risks posed by the internet, and at most a low level of economic and social concern. Not
surprisingly, public opinion concerning the internet is not polarized. The Gaskell and Bauer
survey found that over 70% of respondents believed that the internet "will improve our way
of life," and less than 20% thought it "will make things worse." INDICATORS 2002, supra note
17, at 7-21.
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how these effects comport with the individual's worldview. Once these
initial preferences are formed, so long as scientific uncertainty remains
for a period, various behavioral and psychological phenomena interact
to push most individuals away from moderate positions toward more
extreme ones, and to make most individuals significantly more en-
trenched and unyielding in their views.
Socio-cultural preference formation thus divides individual positions,
and behavioral and psychological biases widen and entrench the divide.
Interest group reliance on science and scientists to stake out mutually
exclusive, opposing positions destabilizes the public's trust in science as
an objective means for resolving the debate. The lack of a vocal middle
precludes compromise positions from being strongly advocated. These
detrimental self-reinforcing cycles debilitate opportunities for bridging the
divide once it has formed. The outcome is inefficient and intransigent
polarization. This outcome blocks resolution of the conflict through
normal avenues of democratic discourse, and precludes optimal use and
regulation of the technology.
Though the elements of the framework are discussed serially, in
practice they cannot be disaggregated. Rather, the framework should be
viewed holistically, with each element continually shaped, and in return
being shaped by, the other elements and the technology conflict. Under-
stood in this manner, the framework provides descriptive explanations
for the inefficiency, deadlock, and polarization that characterize tech-
nology debates. It deciphers the enigmas of why increased scientific
knowledge does not lead to increased agreement; why individuals
strongly adhere to positions they lack the cognitive capacity to ration-
ally form; why interest groups take scientifically untenable positions,
but strongly rely on science to support their cause; and why social wel-
fare-superior solutions that are more efficient and mutually beneficial
are not achieved. Relatedly, it explains those characteristics that cultural
theory alone could not: why there is a high degree of polarization on
certain technology issues, why individuals take positions that conflict
with their cultural worldview, and how certain technology conflicts are
resolved based on increased scientific knowledge.
Although many of the framework influences are empirically sup-
ported, the validity of the framework as a comprehensive descriptor
cannot be empirically proven (like most, if not all, socio-psychological
models that are not tautological). The empirical and analytical evalua-
tion in this Article, however, demonstrates that the framework presented
provides a more powerful explanatory tool than other extant models. On
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this basis, the framework not only is strongly plausible, but also likely
accurately describes technology debates."'
Without an adequate description of why technology debates persist
in a polarized, deadlocked manner it is impossible to settle them. With
an improved understanding of the conflict, resolution is still a daunting
task, but some promising means for advancing it can be identified.
These means, discussed in the following sections, include dialogue and
deliberation, debiasing, and confidence-building measures.
With this approach, I do not seek to change individual beliefs; rather
my goal is to help individuals and groups recognize the preferences un-
derlying their beliefs, and understand that those preferences often can be
satisfied through mutually beneficial compromises. These solutions, of
course, also have direct application to other polarized social and politi-
cal debates unrelated to technology.
A. Cultural Dialogue and Deliberation
The framework reveals that to resolve technology conflict it is nec-
essary to shift the terms and language of technology debates from ones
based primarily in science and objective claims to a discussion that in-
corporates worldview differences. It is impossible to resolve a debate
that is significantly about culture and differing normative views of an
ideal society when the debate is framed primarily in terms of fact and
data.
Reframing technology debates to incorporate worldview discussion
is not easy; a variety of pressures oppose this change. First, in the
United States it is more socially acceptable to debate scientific claims
than it is to debate culture. Scientific claims are supposed to be open to
critique-this is the nature of science as a discipline. Claims sounding
in culture, and particularly claims of cultural-superiority (even if limited
213to particular contexts), on the other hand, often are frowned upon.
211. In this regard, it accomplishes the goal for a model defined by Maxwell Steams:
"The true test of any proposed model is neither its complexity nor its novelty. It is, instead,
whether the model explains more data than the one that it is intended to supersede. The easi-
est way to criticize a model ... is to identify a point of reference, or datum, that the model
fails to explain. The more difficult-and more useful-way to challenge a model, however, is
to offer up an alternative that explains all the data that the prior model explains, plus one."
Maxwell L. Steams, Standing and Social Choice: Historical Evidence, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
309, 310 (1995).
212. POPPER, supra note 66, at 9-10.
213. Kahan & Braman, supra note 93, at 1319 (noting that in this liberalist society,
claims sounding in culture are not well tolerated); Thomas 0. McGarity, Our Science is
Sound Science and Their Science is Junk Science: Science-Based Strategies for Avoiding
Accountability and Responsibility for Risk-Producing Products and Activities, 52 U. KAN. L.
REV. 897, 898-99 (2004) (noting political preferences for appeals to science).
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Second, despite the destabilization of science that occurs, an ele-
vated aura of authority about scientific knowledge remains.24 Science is
viewed as more objective than culture and therefore more persuasive.
Individuals will try to mask their cultural perspective when making a
rhetorical argument so that the argument will not appear culturally bi-
ased, and will be more convincing and attractive to a wider audience.
Arguments originating from a cultural perspective will be dressed up in
scientific clothing.1 5
Third, science can play a significant role in resolving technology
216debates. Achieving broad consensus often requires this. Individuals
realize that scientific information, if persuasive enough, will strongly
affect the debate and therefore rationally rely on scientific information
in an effort to prevail.
Despite these barriers, parts of technology debates already take
place in the arena of culture. Genetically modified product opponents'
concerns about increased control of agriculture and the food supply by
large corporations, about the greater industrialization of agriculture, and
about a negative impact on small family farms and organic farmers, all
concern how society should be organized. Similarly, biotechnology pro-
ponents' arguments for building a better, stronger, food-secure world
through technology are cultural as well. The debates do contain cultural
components, but lack cultural dialogue, as opposed to mere declaratory
cultural statements. Without cultural dialogue, the cultural gap cannot
be bridged.
Dan Kahan, Donald Braman, and John Gastil have proposed a delib-
erative model aimed at overcoming the entrenched divides that result from
cultural worldview differences. Their model focuses on three components:
overdetermined policies, vouching, and dialogue and deliberation.1 7 These
components are discussed in order.
Overdetermined policies are policies that can have multiple social
meanings; they can mean different things to different individuals.t 8
214. See Indicators 2002, supra note 17, at 7-26 to 7-27 (reporting a high level of pub-
lic confidence in scientists relative to other professions).
215. See Nelkin, supra note 132, at 453 ("Though political values or moral issues may
motivate disputes, the actual debates often focus on technical questions."). This is part of the
reason that interest group advocacy sounds in science, even as the groups take scientifically
indefensible positions.
216. See supra Part lI.A.2.
217. Braman et al., A Cultural Critique of Gun Litigation 26-27 (2004) (manuscript on
file with the author).
218. Id. at 26. Cass Sunstein refers to this same concept as "incomplete theorization."
Sunstein, supra note 160, at 1092. Incompletely theorized agreement occurs when individu-
als agree on a course of action, despite disagreeing about the basis for the decision. Id. John
Rawls' concept of "overlapping consensus" is similar as well, referring to agreement on a
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Developing overdetermined policies does not resolve a cultural conflict
itself; after all, one of the central understandings of cultural theory is
that these conflicts cannot be resolved-they are necessary for cultures to
exist in the first instance. Rather, overdetermined policies allow indi-
viduals of differing worldviews to agree on one policy, even while
disagreeing on its meaning or purpose.
The proposed partial solutions to the biotechnology and nuclear
power debates identified earlier in this Article1 9 provide good examples
of overdetermined policies. Both pro- and anti- nuclear power constitu-
encies can support replacing old nuclear plants with newer ones because
each group can attach a different meaning to the replacement. For nu-
clear power supporters, it may be the promotion of technological
progress and efficiency; for nuclear power opponents, it may be the re-
duction in health, safety, and environmental risk. Similarly, improving
genetically modified product regulation may sound in improved effi-
ciency for proponents and in risk reduction for opponents.
The second component is vouching-the need for figures with cul-
tural authority from various cultural worldviews to publicly support a
given solution.22 0 It is not enough for government officials to vouch for
the safety of a technology because, although these officials may be
enough for hierarchists, they likely will not convince individualists or
egalitarians. 2 Scientists may provide adequate cultural authority for
some individualists and hierarchists, but not for egalitarians. Heads of
activist organizations, on the other hand, may provide cultural authority
for many egalitarians, but not for hierarchists.
In areas of significant complexity and uncertainty, individuals likely
are particularly inclined to turn to the views of others who are culturally
respected to inform their opinion. This inclination will be even stronger
where individuals generally lack first-hand knowledge or experience
with a technology, as with those discussed here.222 To be successful, any
solution to technology conflict will need a variety of cultural authority
support.
The third component is dialogue and deliberation. Culture-
conscious dialogue and deliberation can take place to settle on a policy
choice, but only if the discussion focuses explicitly on values, not just
political conception that is endorsed by different individuals for different reasons. RAWLS,
supra note 57, at 184-85.
219. See supra Part I.B.1-2.
220. Braman et al., supra note 217, at 27.
221. This helps to explain why many risk communication programs are not very suc-
cessful-the manner in which the information is communicated often does not comport with
the culture of the targeted individuals. See Slovic, Trust, supra note 97, at 88 (noting risk
communication efforts fail where the information recipient does not trust the communicator).
222. Rohrmann & Renn, supra, note 97, at 31.
Technology Wars
competing scientific claims. The dialogue is aimed at helping different
groups learn about each other and each other's views, with a goal of cul-
tural accommodation and understanding.223 Once these objectives have
been achieved, a substantive policy deliberation can begin, aimed at de-
veloping widely-acceptable policy solutions.2
Evidence suggests that dialogue and deliberation can lead individu-
als to better understand differing points of view. The National Issues
Convention, for example, brought together a random national sample of
over 400 United States citizens to spend four days in small group dis-
cussions on political issues including family policy, foreign policy, and
economic policy.225 The participants were polled on their positions con-
cerning a wide-variety of issues related to these three policy topics both
before and after the Convention. Material to the analysis here, a signifi-
cant number of people changed their position on every one of the fifty-
nine issues they were polled about as a result of this deliberation. The
percentage of participants changing their positions ranged from over
14% to over 50% on the various questions, with most questions having a
change in the upper end of this range 6. 22 Further, the average position of
all participants displayed a statistically significant shift on half of the
position questions.227
The participants at the National Issues Convention behaved in a
manner conducive to productive dialogue and deliberation. Both the par-
ticipants and observers perceived that the participants showed respect
for the opinions of others, listened to each other, and enjoyed talking to
people with different backgrounds and political beliefs.
2 2 8 As a result,
the participants learned from each other and tried to connect with each
other.229 Further, with respect to resolving technology conflict, the par-
ticipants routinely proposed solutions to the problems discussed.
3°
223. Braman et al., supra note 217, at 28, 30.
224. Id. at 34.
225. James S. Fishkin & Robert C. Luskin, Bringing Deliberation to the Democratic
Dialogue, in THE POLL WITH A HUMAN FACE: THE NATIONAL ISSUES CONVENTION EXPERI-
MENT IN POLITICAL COMMUNICATION 3 (Maxwell McCombs & Amy Reynolds eds., 1999).
The participants were provided with short briefing material describing three positions on
each of the three main policy topics. Id.
226. Id. at 25-27.
227. Id. at 25.
228. Tom W. Smith, The Delegates' Experience, in THE POLL WITH A HUMAN FACE:
THE NATIONAL ISSUES CONVENTION EXPERIMENT IN POLITICAL COMMUNICATION 39, 46
(Maxwell McCombs & Amy Reynolds eds., 1999).
229. Roderick Hart & Sharon Jarvis, We the People: The Contours of Lay Political Dis-
course, in THE POLL WITH A HUMAN FACE: THE NATIONAL ISSUES CONVENTION
EXPERIMENT IN POLITICAL COMMUNICATION 59, 81 (Maxwell McCombs & Amy Reynolds
eds., 1999); Smith, supra note 228, at 47.
230. Hart & Jarvis, supra note 229, at 81.
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Another effort at dialogue and deliberation, focused on an issue di-
rectly relevant to this Article, was the Pew Initiative on Food and
Biotechnology's Stakeholder Forum. Periodically from 2001 to 2003,
the Stakeholder Forum brought together various stakeholders directly
engaged in the genetically modified food debate in an effort to build
consensus on issues concerning this technology. 23' The Stakeholder Fo-
rum members were able to agree on the general outcomes, principles,
and components of a regulatory system, but were not able to reach
agreement in significant detail 2 The members did agree that the dia-
logue was "very constructive" and that the Forum provided "a valuable
opportunity for members to be exposed to different ideas and perspec-
tives, learn from each other, and forge new relationships. 233 One reason
the Stakeholder Forum did not achieve greater consensus may be its
failure to explicitly include representatives with moderate views; polar-
ized interest groups appear to have been over-represented at the Forum,
and individuals with moderate positions under-represented.
Dialogue and deliberation also should have several second-order ef-
fects that attenuate the impact of certain negative behavioral and
psychological phenomena. Discourse among individuals with varied
preferences should aid in reducing the effect of group polarization. A
prerequisite of group polarization is that the initial preferences of the
group members all fall on one side of an issue. Groups of individuals
who have mixed initial preferences, on the other hand, tend to reduce
their polarization through deliberation.3 Relatedly, groups made up of
individuals with differing positions demonstrate less of a confirmation
bias in their information searches and analyses. 235 This type of discourse
also should make a greater variety of images available to individuals,
reducing the polarizing effects of interest group framing, 36 the availabil-
ity heuristic, and informational and reputational cascades.
The National Issues Convention in particular, as well as the Stake-
holder Forum, demonstrate that dialogue and deliberation can cause
individual and group positions to change significantly. Such discourse
231. PEW INITIATIVE ON FOOD AND BIOTECHNOLOGY, THE STAKEHOLDER FORUM ON
AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY: AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROCESS 3 (2003), available at
http://pewagbiotech.org/consensus/FinalReport.pdf [hereinafter PEW INITIATIVE] (last visited
May 11, 2005). Participants included representatives from the biotechnology industry, envi-
ronmental and consumer advocacy groups, farming and ranching communities, food
processing and marketing companies, and academia. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 3-4.
234. Amiram Vinokur & Eugene Burnstein, Depolarization of Attitudes in Groups, 36 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 872, 884 (1978).
235. Schulz-Hardt et al., supra note 172, at 666.
236. See Vraneski & Richter, supra note 14, at 246 (noting that discourse can promote
reframing of issues).
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promotes an environment for discussing worldview differences as well
as scientific evidence, and it also attenuates the influence of several be-
havioral and cognitive biases. On these bases, dialogue and deliberation
can be a productive means for defusing polarized technology conflict.
B. Debiasing
The numerous behavioral and psychological barriers that enhance
polarization and deadlock mean that simply engaging in culturally forth-
right dialogue and deliberation will not be enough to resolve the
technology conflicts at issue. Even an open cultural dialogue cannot be
expected to overcome the impacts of various heuristics, the effects of
group polarization, and the status quo bias. Many of these biases tend to
make individuals view people with differing opinions as non-objective,
self-serving, and unduly ideological.237 As a result, methods for helping
individuals understand how their views of the other side and the other
side's position have become biased are required. Individual judgment
must be debiased from the behavioral and psychological phenomena
that increase polarization and deadlock.238
Unfortunately, psychological and behavioral biases have proven ex-
tremely robust in the face of varied efforts to eliminate them or lessen
their impact. 39 One debiasing failure is particularly noteworthy here:
having opposing individuals or groups of individuals discuss their dif-
fering viewpoints does not attenuate biases. 21 Often discussion among
opposing individuals and groups further exacerbates polarization and
perceived polarization, as each individual interprets the content of the
discussion to reinforce their own position and weaken their opponent's,
likely due in part to the biased assimilation of new data.24'
237. See supra Part II.B.
238. Another strategy would be to take advantage of countervailing heuristics that may
tend to reduce polarization and deadlock ("if you can't beat them, join them"). One example
would be to try to increase the effect of the compromise bias on individual judgment. This
bias causes individuals to avoid choosing extreme outcomes. See supra note 189 and accom-
panying text. Trying to increase the influence of judgmental biases, however, is not well
understood, and more importantly, is ethically problematic. In addition, one still will have to
debias the influence of other heuristics.
239. See generally Fischoff, supra note 166 (surveying debiasing efforts in a wide vari-
ety of studies).
240. See supra Part Il.B. 1; Pronin et al., supra note 145, at 652-53.
241. See supra Part II.B. 1; Pronin et al., supra note 145, at 652-53. How biases impact
group decision-making also is crucial to resolving technology conflict. Unfortunately,
whether decision-making groups are more or less prone to bias than individuals is a complex
issue without simple trends-group decision-making can exacerbate or ameliorate bias in
manners that are not yet understood. Norbert L. Kerr et al., Bias in Judgment: Comparing
Individuals and Groups, 103 PSYCH. REV. 687, 692-93 (1996); see Samuel Issacharoff,
Comment, Behavioral Decision Theory in the Court of Public Law, 87 CORNELL L. REV.
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Despite the intransigence of cognitive and behavioral biases, their
effects are not absolute. For instance, roughly half the respondents to the
National Science Board's survey thought that genetically modified food
was risky, but approximately 70% perceived it to be useful.2 42 These data
demonstrate that the affect heuristic and cognitive dissonance avoidance
do not entirely control individual preferences. Similarly, the discussion
of global warming and the risk of brain cancer from cellular telephone
use demonstrate that the biased assimilation of new data and confirma-
tion bias are not unsurmountable.
Recent work concerning debiasing has focused on how individuals
process information.243 Individuals comprehend reality and process infor-
mation through two parallel cognitive systems. One is an intuitive
experiential system ("intuition"); the other a deliberative, analytic system
("reasoning"). Intuition operates in a fast, automatic, and associative man-
ner; it is often emotionally charged and governed by habit, so it is difficult
to control or modify.24 Reasoning operates in a slower, serial, effortful
manner; it is more consciously controlled and deliberative than intui-
tion.24 The two cognitive methods operate in parallel, but not in
isolation. The impressions created by intuition generally control judg-
ments and preferences. Reason, however, continually monitors intuition
and will override an intuitive judgment or preference if it appears to be
246in error.
Understanding how individuals perceive reality and process infor-
mation points to two potential debiasing methods. The first is to make
different information more available to individuals and to exploit indi-
vidual intuitive biases. This solution, however, provides little practical
application for technology debates concerning genetically modified
products or nuclear power. Neither issue can be usefully contained in a
narrowly limited amount of accessible information. In addition, trying
to identify what this limited amount of accessible information should be
would lead one right back into the polarized and deadlocked debate.
The second potential debiasing method is more promising but po-
tentially even more difficult to achieve. This method requires a shift in
individuals' manner of cognitive judgment concerning technology from
671, 672-73 (2002) (noting the lack of experimental studies concerning how individual be-
havioral phenomena manifest themselves in complex institutional settings).
242. INDICATORs 2002, supra note 17, at 7-18.
243. Kahneman, supra note 147, at 698, 700.
244. Id.
245. Id. Intuition and reasoning also have been labeled System 1 and System 2, respec-
tively. Id.
246. Id. at 710-11, 716. Errors in judgment thus involve a failure of both systems: in-
tuition which generated the erroneous judgment, and reason which failed to catch and correct
it. Id.
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one based on intuition to one based more on reasoning. As a result, in-
dividuals would become more aware of intuitive errors they make and
would analyze technology issues more carefully24
7 How to cause a shift
from intuition to reasoning, however, is a complex problem on which
research has just barely begun.2 8
Directing individuals to consider why their position might be wrong
or to step into the opposition's shoes may be one method of achieving
this reasoning shift, and is one debiasing strategy that has shown prom-
ise.249 Individuals required to express what they consider the other side's
best arguments subsequently view the other side as less extreme and
perceive the opposing sides to be closer together (less polarized) than
previously.2 0 Having individuals who support a technology list all of its
risks, or individuals who oppose a technology list all of its benefits, may
be another way to accomplish this goal. In this regard, recall that a gen-
eral failure to consider why a position one holds could be wrong has
been suggested as a cause of certain biases. 5'
It is worth noting that some degree of paternalism or government in-
tervention is appropriate to achieve these ends precisely because it is a
debiasing effort.5 2 Behavioral economics and cognitive psychology re-
search teach that heuristic phenomena lead individuals to make
judgments and take actions they would not choose if the judgments were
247. Id. at 711 (noting that people will correct, and possibly even overcorrect, intuitive
errors when they are made aware of them).
248. See id. at 716 (identifying this as an area that needs research).
249. Chapman & Johnson, supra note 168, at 134; Pronin et al., supra note 145, at 653;
Fischoff, supra note 166, at 438; Charles G. Lord et al., Considering the Opposite: A Correc-
tive Strategy of Social Judgment, 47 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1231, 1241 (1984)
(finding that the confirmation bias is attenuated if individuals are instructed to consider al-
ternatives).
Jeffrey Rachlinski and Cynthia Farina identify President Kennedy's use of his brother in
an explicit "devil's advocate" role as a productive means of reducing overconfidence bias
among President Kennedy's advisors. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive
Psychology and Optimal Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 561-62 (2002).
This role is comparable to directing individuals to try to argue from opposing perspectives.
250. Pronin et al., supra note 145, at 653. Getting individuals to view technology issues
from the other side is certainly easier said than done. In addition to cognitive barriers already
discussed, it also will require individuals overcoming the egocentrism bias. This bias refers
to individuals' general inability to take another person's perspective, and relatedly, to assume
that other people's perspectives are the same as their own. Raymond S. Nickerson, How We
Know-and Sometimes Misjudge-What Others Know: Imputing One's Own Knowledge to
Others, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 737, 738 (1999).
251. Chapman & Johnson, supra note 168, at 134.
252. See generally Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral
Economics and the Case for "Asymmetric Paternalism", 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211 (2003)
(arguing that paternalistic regulation is appropriate where individual decisionmaking is
flawed due to biases); Sunstein, supra note 160, at 1073-74; Jolls et al., supra note 56, at
1541 (arguing that understanding bounded rationality leads to an anti-antipaternalistic posi-
tion).
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fully understood. Intervention aimed at assisting individuals in making
fully informed, reasoned judgments to improve each individual's own
welfare is legitimate under almost any political model.253 Achieving
these debiasing efforts will reduce polarization and deadlock, and if im-
plemented early enough, will prevent them from becoming exacerbated
in the first instance.
C. Confidence-Building Measures
Confidence-building measures are a potentially productive tool for
resolving technology conflict.5 Confidence-building measures are a
concept developed in international relations. They are relatively quick
and inexpensive incremental measures that reduce tension and build
trust between parties in a conflict. Confidence-building measures do not
seek to solve a conflict immediately, but rather to provide concrete steps
that all parties can agree upon, in part to de-escalate tension in a con-
flict. Through improving communication and uniting the parties in
common short-term goals, these measures can create a climate more
conducive to negotiation and to reaching consensus on permanent solu-
tions to a conflict.
255
The technology conflict framework reveals that confidence-building
measures are likely a necessary first step in resolving technology de-
bates. Because of the elevated levels of cultural conflict and acrimony
that have developed in these debates, they likely cannot be resolved
without first reducing tension and building trust between opposing par-
ties to create an environment more conducive to further negotiation
regarding the conflict directly. The recommendations for resolving
technology debates identified above fit neatly within the concept of con-
fidence-building measures. Forthright cultural dialogue will improve
communication and lower tensions. Having individuals proactively con-
sider why their position may be wrong or provide the other sides' best
arguments will lead to greater mutual understanding of differing posi-
tions and concerns, reducing acrimony between the parties and building
trust. 56 The Stakeholder Forum demonstrates the potential value of con-
fidence-building measures. Though the parties ultimately were unable to
253. Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymo-
ron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1161-62 (2003) (arguing for paternalism "to steer people's
choices in directions that will improve the chooser's own welfare"); Camerer et al., supra
note 252, at 1211-14.
254. See Mandel, supra note 192 (proposing the use of confidence building measures to
resolve the genetically modified product debate).
255. Id. at 42.
256. See ScHON & REM, supra note 112, at 195-96 (discussing the importance of build-
ing trust to resolve policy controversies).
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agree on a comprehensive regulatory plan, they believed that their dia-
logue and deliberation was "very constructive" and enabled them to
"learn from each other."27 In addition, the Forum participants agreed
that further discussions aimed at pursuing consensus were warranted.
258
Deliberation need not take place in an information vacuum. The par-
ticipants at the National Issues Convention were provided with jointly
developed briefing materials describing three different positions ("lib-
eral," "moderate," and "conservative") on each of the issues discussed
there. 2 9 Similar materials could be developed for technology issues as a
means of education concerning actual benefits and risks. These materi-
als could be prepared by various interest groups, including scientists and
others. Involving parties with various worldviews in drafting the brief-
ing materials will enable the materials to be accepted by individuals
with differing worldviews.26
Confidence-building measures do not seek to change individual
preferences, but to enable individuals to better understand others' pref-
erences and to recognize that differing preferences may be satisfied in a
single solution. One of the lessons of cultural theory is that expressed
disagreement may result from divergent perceptions of risk, rather than
different goals in the first instance. Hierarchists, individualists, and
egalitarians all may strongly support the goal of a healthy environment.
They may disagree, however, on whether genetically modified products
or nuclear power pose significant environmental risks. Recognizing mu-
tual goals in these instances will make the task of reaching agreement
significantly easier, particularly in situations where scientific knowledge
develops toward a consensus regarding whether certain risks should be
discounted or recognized.
257. See supra text accompanying note 233. Though partially successful as a confi-
dence-building measure, the Stakeholder Forum may have failed in part because of its
limited inclusion of representatives holding moderate or compromise positions. See id.
258. PEW INITIATIVE, supra note 23 1, at 4.
259. Fishkin & Luskin, supra note 225.
260. Mariano-Florentino Cuellar's proposal to improve public participation in agency
rulemaking contains certain similarities to the proposal provided in this Article. See Cuellar,
supra note 55 (studying public participation in agency rulemaking). Cuellar proposes an
independent "participation agency" that would select members of the public to learn about,
and participate in discussions about, proposed regulatory rules. Id. at Part III.B. The partici-
pation agency would provide the participants with risk and cost benefit analysis materials
about the regulation, and provide moderators to facilitate the discussion. Id. The goal of such
participation is to improve the sophistication and salience of individual members of the pub-
lic's input on regulatory rulemaking, and to provide a better mechanism for taking into
account public values in regulatory rulemaking. Id. at Introduction, Part III.B.
Alternatively, a group made up of experts with various worldviews could be established
to engage in some degree of fact-checking of interest group claims. Such a group may have a
difficult time maintaining an aura of reliability as it would often come under attack from
both polar positions on many issues.
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Giving experts an explicit role in the dialogue and deliberation also
may reduce some of the cognitive limitations discussed earlier. Experi-
ence and expertise help individuals overcome cognitive biases in certain
circumstances, for instance by having learned from similar situations and
decision-making previously, and from expert training.26' On the other
hand, experts sometimes demonstrate greater cognitive biases than lay-
people, a more extreme overconfidence bias being one oft-demonstrated
example.6 2 Allowing lay individuals to engage in deliberation, with input
from experts, may provide the best means for taking advantage of each
group's strengths (e.g., lay sensibilities and expert knowledge) while lim-
iting the extent of each group's biases (e.g., lay inability to deal with
factually complex judgment and expert overconfidence).
Integrating scientific knowledge in the manner described above also
may ameliorate concerns some scientists feel about getting involved in
what are seen as political policy and legal debates. Many scientists per-
ceive that they should remain disinterested in the policy issues of
technology debates, providing only factual scientific information. For
this reason scientists often are disinclined to get involved and share their
knowledge at all. 263 This attitude exacerbates the destabilization and
politicization of science. The scientific community has a significant role
to play in resolution of technology debates, both because many of the
concerns involve scientific questions and because it is regarded with one
of the highest levels of public confidence.2 6 Involving scientists in the
manner described above should provide an acceptable and comfortable
way of achieving this goal. In addition, integrating scientists and scien-
tific knowledge into the general dialogue and deliberation will help to
re-stabilize the public's destabilized view of science, particularly as the
public may come to recognize that there actually is significant scientific
agreement on many of the issues involved.265
The technology conflict framework reveals that risk preference is a
function of both scientific knowledge and cultural worldview. In ex-
treme instances one factor can dominate the other: if there is near-
complete uncertainty, culture dominates; if there is near-zero uncer-
261. See Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 249, at 558-61 (discussing how experts have
advantages over laypersons with respect to having their judgment improperly influenced by
cognitive biases because of past experiences with similar problems, the opportunity for feed-
back on past decisions, and expert training).
262. Griffin & Tversky, supra note 164, at 230.
263. Thompson, supra note 175, at 273 (noting one problem with convincing scientists
to advocate for science-based positions is the scientists' concern that they should remain
disinterested).
264. INDICATORs 2002, supra note 17, at 7-26, 7-28.
265. See Mandel, supra note 39, at 2179-80 n.32 (discussing significant expert agree-
ment on the scientific benefits and risks of genetically modified products).
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tainty, science dominates. In the substantial majority of circumstances,
however, uncertainty lies somewhere between these poles, and both sci-
ence and culture influence preferences. Unfortunately, these two factors
are often conflated, blocking recognition and understanding of their ac-
tual impact. Confidence-building measures provide a means for both
science and culture to play their appropriate, distinct roles in resolving
technology conflict."6
Resolving technology conflict will require an initial group of
highly-committed individuals with varied worldviews who are interested
in cultural and scientific dialogue, engaging in debiasing efforts, and
exploring overdetermined polices. As discussions evolve, this group will
need to draw in individuals with cultural authority from various world-
views who can vouch for the process and the solutions being explored.
Once these first steps have been achieved, parties can turn productively
to second-order levels of dispute resolution. These may include the
identification of common goals and interests, and seeking mutually
beneficial solutions to portions of the conflict. That individuals have
different cultural worldviews or are polarized in their positions does not
preclude them from finding common goals. Overdetermined solutions
often exist, as proposed earlier in this Article for both the biotechnology
and nuclear power conflicts. Individuals with differing opinions can find
different reasons to support the same goal. Vouching, in turn, will help
to cause certain of the polarized interest groups and other individuals to
join this process, eventually leading to a critical mass that can effect
change.
Identifying common goals and developing broad-based solutions
will steel those trying to resolve the conflict against conflict entrepre-
neurs, who will attempt to prevent resolution, or even partial
resolutions, from being achieved. In a certain sense, the solutions pro-
posed here aim to shift the outcome of technology conflict from a
polarized status quo that has been co-opted by conflict entrepreneurs for
their special interests to a social welfare-superior result that is mutually
beneficial to a vastly wider population. Conflict entrepreneurs will op-
pose the change forcefully-they have much to lose and are well
experienced in promoting conflict. To overcome this pressure, it is nec-
essary to make the benefits of solution clear to a wide variety and large
number of individuals.
Convincing individuals to engage in the forgoing tasks will not be
simple. Many individuals may exhibit significant indifference to tech-
nology conflict issues and to a greater consideration of those issues, or
266. See Cuellar, supra note 55, at Introduction, Part III.B (recognizing that risk, cost-
benefit analysis, and values all must be taken into account in agency rulemaking decisions).
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they may exhibit rational ignorance towards debates they view their in-
volvement as unlikely to change. Several mechanisms and influences
should help overcome the inertia of indifference and rational ignorance.
First, the research reported above demonstrates that individuals do value
learning more about issues and more about various viewpoints on is-
sues.2 67 Second, a study of public comment on proposed federal
regulation revealed that individual members of the public are interested
in, and provided salient comment on, diverse regulation.2 6 Third, the
high level of public interest in technology issues, as well as the existing
involvement of interest groups, will attract many individuals to learn
more. 269 Fourth, the involvement of figures with cultural authority from
various worldviews will engage as many people as possible.270
Parallel to the endeavors identified above should be efforts to reduce
scientific uncertainty concerning the relevant technology. These efforts
must be cast at all three levels of technological uncertainty: the facts
surrounding the technology, the risks and benefits indicated by those
facts, and how to respond to the risks and benefits. 27' As discussed, sci-
entific knowledge can lead to greater consensus. It is not possible to
know beforehand when the scientific tipping point will be reached, but
this should not deter attempts to improve scientific knowledge and un-
derstanding. Reducing uncertainty, in turn, likely requires devoting
greater resources to scientific research.
CONCLUSION
Technology wars extract a great toll on society. They create costly
inefficiencies, lead to legal and policy paralysis, consume vast re-
sources, and prevent the optimal use and regulation of technology.
Despite these substantial consequences, little attention has been paid to
placing the conflicts within a common framework. The attention that
has been given has focused almost exclusively on institutional decision-
making and has largely ignored the role that individual preference for-
mation, behavior, psychology, perception, and action play in technology
controversies. The technology conflict framework developed here seeks
to fill this void.
267. See supra notes 225-233 and accompanying text.
268. Cuellar, supra note 55, at Parts II.D.2, II.E.
269. See INDICATORs 2002, supra note 17, at 7-4 to 7-5 (reporting a high level of pub-
lic interest in science and technology issues).
270. See supra notes 220-222 and accompanying text.
271. See supra text accompanying note 199.
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The framework identifies the critical roles that both culture and
science play in shaping individual technology preferences, and reveals
that these roles often are conflated and blurred, leading to polarization
and dysfunctional debate. Achieving a frank discussion of culture and
a clear view of science will go a long way toward creating a produc-
tive democratic discourse that can resolve technology debates. The
solutions described provide a road map for using confidence-building
measures to generate support for social welfare-improving solutions,
starting with small groups and building to larger constituencies, even-
tually cascading to a tipping point that will lead to widespread
implementation.
The culmination of the resolution efforts described above should
be the development of greater consensus among a broad coalition of
constituencies about goals for the use and regulation of a given tech-
nology, and the manner of achieving those goals. Such consensus
would result in substantial improvement in individual and social wel-
fare, both because mutually beneficial solutions to the technology
conflict can be achieved and because these solutions will free up re-
sources for all parties to use in more socially productive manners.
Resolving technology conflict will provide further benefit by allowing
greater technological advance. This advance will occur both as some
of the recovered resources are devoted to additional research and de-
velopment, and because the existence of polarization retards
technology investment and efforts. Though the effort required to ame-
liorate technology conflict is significant, the potential gains are
extraordinary.
The analysis contained is this Article applies to the genetically
modified product and nuclear power debates discussed, as well as to
any technology debate in which scientific knowledge can provide
relevant and reliable information, but due to remaining uncertainty
about benefits and risks does not appear to properly influence individ-
ual preferences. In coming years, debates over social, economic, and
environmental impacts of nanotechnology are a prime candidate for
demonstrating these inefficiencies.
Substantial portions of this framework can be applied to appar-
ently intractable debates outside of the science and technology
spheres. Many of the issues analyzed in the framework go fundamen-
tally to individual preference formation and retention, and relatedly, to
many forms of conflict and conflict resolution. The framework pre-
sented here provides a basis for resolving polarized, deadlocked
debates in many areas.
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The questions posed in the first paragraph of this Article are not
easily answered. Determining the optimal regulation of genetically
modified products, nuclear power, and nanotechnology are complex
issues. Application of this framework, however, will remove unneces-
sary inefficiency and polarization from these debates, and nurture a
functional democratic discourse that can defuse these technology
wars.
